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Market definition of multi-sided platforms in European Union competition law: 
Theory and practice 
 
Multi-sided platforms are firms which, by acting as intermediaries, enable interaction of 
distinct but related consumer groups. They operate on two-sided markets that are 
characterised by indirect network effects and create added value by internalising these 
network effects. The Internet and the development of information and communication 
technology have contributed to their growth and today the most valuable firms in the 
world by market capitalisation are platforms firms. Despite the vast economic literature, 
the effects of platforms to competition law, however, remain ambiguous. 
 
In my thesis, I study multi-sided platforms in the European Union competition law. By 
using methods of law and economics, I focus especially on the question of how the 
relevant market in two-sided markets should be defined for the purposes of assessment of 
market power and competitive effects. I present the economic theory underlying 
competition law and two-sided markets and, in the light of that theory, discuss the role 
and tools of market definition in antitrust analysis of platforms. I further analyse the Court 
of Justice's seminal rulings in Groupement des cartes bancaires and MasterCard, which 
concerned the two-sided nature of payment card systems, and discuss their implications 
for the EU competition law. 
 
Although the Court of Justice has not explicitly discussed market definition in two-sided 
markets, its case law leaves no doubt that the two-sided nature of platforms matter for 
their competitive analysis under the EU competition rules. I propose that the European 
Commission should clarify its practice on certain questions of market definition relating 
particularly to when a ‘single’ two-sided market and when two separate but ‘interrelated’ 
markets should be defined, how to adjust the SSNIP test to take network effects into 
account and how to define the relevant market in the presence of a zero price on one side 
of the platform. I present my own recommendations for these practices and contribute to 
the debate on the subject which is currently of particular interest as the Commission is 
renewing its Notice on Market Definition. 
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Market definition of multi-sided platforms in European Union competition law: 
Theory and practice 
 
Monenpuoliset alustat ovat yrityksiä, jotka toimien välittäjinä mahdollistavat erillisten 
mutta toisistaan riippuvaisten kuluttajaryhmien välisen vuorovaikutuksen. Ne toimivat 
kaksipuolisilla markkinoilla, joilla on epäsuoria verkostovaikutuksia, ja luovat lisäarvoa 
sisäistämällä nämä verkostovaikutukset. Internet sekä tieto- ja viestintätekniikan kehitys 
ovat myötävaikuttaneet niiden kasvuun ja nykyään markkina-arvoltaan maailman 
arvokkaimmat yritykset ovat alustayrityksiä. Laajasta taloustieteellisestä kirjallisuudesta 
huolimatta alustojen vaikutukset kilpailuoikeuteen ovat kuitenkin yhä moniselitteisiä. 
 
Tutkielmassani tarkastelen monenpuolisia alustoja Euroopan unionin kilpailuoikeudessa. 
Keskityn oikeustaloustieteen menetelmiä hyödyntäen erityisesti kysymykseen siitä 
kuinka merkitykselliset markkinat tulisi määritellä kaksipuolisilla markkinoilla 
markkinavoiman ja kilpailuvaikutusten arvioinnin tarkoituksia varten. Esittelen 
kilpailuoikeuden ja kaksipuolisten markkinoiden pohjana olevan talousteorian ja 
keskustelen sen valossa markkinamäärittelyn roolista ja välineistä alustojen 
kilpailuoikeudellisessa tarkastelussa. Analysoin lisäksi unionin tuomioistuimen 
merkittäviä ratkaisuja tapauksissa Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ja MasterCard, 
jotka koskivat maksukorttijärjestelmien kaksipuolista luonnetta, ja keskustelen näiden 
vaikutuksista EU:n kilpailuoikeuteen. 
 
Vaikka unionin tuomioistuin ei ole eksplisiittisesti käsitellyt markkinoiden määrittelyä 
kaksipuolisilla markkinoilla, sen oikeuskäytäntö ei jätä epäilystäkään siitä, että alustojen 
kaksipuolisella luonteella on merkitystä niiden kilpailuoikeudelliselle tarkastelulle EU:n 
kilpailuoikeussääntöjen mukaan. Esitän, että Euroopan komission tulisi selkeyttää 
käytäntöään tietyissä markkinoiden määrittelyn kysymyksissä, jotka liittyvät erityisesti 
siihen, milloin ‘yksi’ kaksipuolinen markkina ja milloin kaksi erillistä mutta ‘toisiinsa 
liittyvää’ markkinaa tulisi määritellä, kuinka SSNIP-testi tulisi muokata huomioimaan 
verkostovaikutukset ja kuinka relevantit markkinat tulisi määritellä silloin, kun yhdellä 
puolella alustaa on nollahinnat. Esitän omat suositukseni näiksi käytännöiksi ja osallistun 
keskusteluun aiheesta, joka on tällä hetkellä erityisen kiinnostuksen kohteena, sillä 
komissio on uudistamassa tiedonantonsa merkityksellisten markkinoiden määritelmästä. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Internet and the development of the information and communication technology (ICT) 
during the last thirty years have transformed the lives of billions of people around the world 
and, with it, the economy and the way companies do business with consumers and each other. 
The technological, economic and societal impact of this transformation has been so profound 
that some have dubbed this change ‘the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ which blurs the lines 
between the physical, digital and biological spheres.1 Introduction of new technologies has had 
a disruptive effect on many markets while marking a way towards a data- and algorithm-driven 
digital economy. 
 
At the heart of the digital economy are platforms (‘two-sided platforms’ or more generally 
‘multi-sided platforms’ in terms of economics) which create added value by bringing together 
different groups of customers that are useful to each other. By this service, platforms enable 
and facilitate interaction of these groups and decrease their transaction costs. As the number of 
people and companies using digital platforms have increased, so has their importance to the 
economy. Today, many of the world’s most valuable firms are platform firms. For example, in 
May 2020, among the top 10 weighted companies in the S&P 500 -index, which includes 500 
leading publicly traded companies from different industries in the United States, were six firms 
with a platform business model: Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Alphabet (Google) and 
Visa.2 
 
There are many features which distinguish platform firms from traditional firms. Instead of 
operating on conventional markets where producers of goods and their consumers meet, 
platforms facilitate this interaction, thus operating on ‘two-sided markets’ in terminology of 
economics. Two-sided markets do not necessarily involve the Internet but are often enhanced 
by it. Among others, they include software operating systems, social media platforms, dating 
services, video game consoles, newspapers, stock exchanges, shopping malls and television and 
radio stations. Software operating systems, for example, connect users, application developers 
and hardware manufacturers. The demand of these groups is interdependent. As the number of 
applications for an operating system increases, the operating system becomes more attractive 
for the users and hardware manufacturers which in turn makes it more attractive for application 
 
1 Schwab 2015. 
2 S&P Dow Jones Indices 2020. 
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developers to develop applications for the operating system. This (positive) indirect network 
effect increases the value of the platform as the number of its customers increase. 
 
Due to their special features and increased importance in the economy, multi-sided platforms 
have caught the attention of competition authorities, who promote competition by investigating 
and preventing anticompetitive practices. Anticompetitive practices usually require that a firm 
has market power, which is the ability of firms to influence prices and profitably raise them 
above marginal costs3 for extended periods of time.4 Raising prices above marginal costs is 
generally deemed socially harmful because in the neoclassical economic theory social welfare 
is maximised in a competitive equilibrium where prices equal marginal costs.5 In such markets 
of perfect competition, firms cannot influence prices and have no market power. However, 
perfect competition is mainly a useful theoretical benchmark which is never observed in the 
real world because of its restrictive assumptions (e.g. large number of buyers and sellers in the 
market, perfect information and no transaction costs). Determining perfectly competitive prices 
can also be very challenging as marginal costs themselves are unobservable and subject to same 
issues of reliability as the data they are derived from. Consequently, any competitive price in 
antitrust analysis can only approximate a perfectly competitive price. 
 
Because of the complexities of multi-sided platforms, performing antitrust analysis in two-sided 
markets is inherently more difficult than in traditional markets. Conventional methods and tools 
used by competition authorities in analysis of traditional markets may produce incorrect results 
when used in analysis of two-sided markets. This has created a need to rethink antitrust tools 
for multi-sided platforms. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Competition Committee held a hearing in June 2017 in which it invited 
economists to discuss whether the traditional tools for defining markets, assessing market 
power and efficiencies and assessing the effects of exclusionary conduct and vertical restraints 
remained usable in analysis of multi-sided platforms and how might these tools to be adjusted, 
if adjustments were needed. Based on the discussions and papers presented therein, the OECD 
published a report in 2018 which contained recommendations how different tools might be used 
by the competition authorities in competitive assessment of multi-sided markets.6 However, the 
debate about the proper way to account for the multi-sided features of platforms in antitrust 
 
3 Marginal cost is the first derivative of a cost function. Informally, it means the cost of producing one more unit 
of a good. 
4 Belleflamme and Peitz 2010, p. 41. 
5 See e.g. Feldman and Serrano 2006. 
6 OECD 2018. 
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analysis continues on as lively as it has been since the formulation of the theory of two-sided 
markets in the early 2000’s. This thesis is part of that discussion. 
 
In this thesis, I study multi-sided platforms in the European Union competition law. I focus 
especially on the question of how the relevant market in two-sided markets should be defined 
for the purposes of competitive assessment. The methodology of the thesis is interdisciplinary. 
I adopt the law and economics approach to address the topic in a general, theoretical level while 
also discussing the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Commission in antitrust cases concerning payment card systems, which arguably have been the 
most influential type of platforms to the development of competition practice regarding multi-
sided platforms. 
 
In the first chapter, I introduce the topic and the structure of the thesis. In the second chapter, I 
present the economic theory in the fields of industrial organization and two-sided markets and 
the role of market definition in antitrust analysis. In the third chapter, I provide an overview of 
the general principles and sources of the EU law and competition law, focusing on restrictive 
agreements under Article 101 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In the fourth 
chapter, I discuss the reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union in its seminal 
judgments involving payment card systems and the implications of those judgments for the EU 
competition law. In the fifth chapter, I present my conclusions. 
 
2. Economic theory 
 
 Development of industrial organization theory 
 
Competition in free markets has been the study of the economics since the days of Adam Smith 
and his publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776.7 It was Smith who first proposed that 
competition between dealers drives prices down to their natural price or, in modern terms, to 
market equilibrium, benefiting the consumer. Smith also recognised that the interest of the 
dealers is always in some respect different from the interest of the public and that restricting 
competition allows dealers to raise their profits above what they would naturally be at the 
expense of the society. Smith was followed by a generation of British political economists, such 
 
7 Smith 1976. 
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as David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, who promoted free markets and trade to replace earlier 
mercantilist practices. 
 
The first formal analysis of competition between two firms was conducted by Cournot in 1838.8 
Cournot formulated a mathematical model in which firms independently and simultaneously 
make decisions on amount they produce. His model leads to an equilibrium in which the profit-
maximising firms choose quantities with prices above competitive price. In the Cournot model, 
the equilibrium price approaches competitive price as the number of firms approaches infinity. 
In 1883, Bertrand proposed another duopoly model, which was formalised by Edgeworth9 in 
1897, in which the firms independently and simultaneously choose prices instead of amount of 
production.10 The Bertrand model, in contrast to the Cournot model, leads to an equilibrium in 
which prices equal marginal cost, that is, competitive price. Both models have been highly 
influential in economics and been later modified and supplemented by other authors.  
 
The benefits of competition and the harmful effects of its restrains were then already well 
recognised by the classical economists of the 1800’s. The industrial revolution transformed 
western economies, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, and gave birth 
to giant industrial companies and, with them, to new competition problems. At the turn of the 
20th century, the first antitrust laws were enacted in the United States to regulate the industrial 
conglomerates by prohibiting cartels and forming of monopolies when the Sherman Act (1890), 
the Clayton Act (1914) and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) were adopted by the 
United States Congress. These acts and the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States 
that followed them still forms the core of modern antitrust law in the United States. 
 
Antitrust law and economics have had a symbiotic relationship: each supports the other. New 
antitrust laws were based on economic thought from the beginning. The adopting of first 
antitrust laws, in turn, increased demand for economic study of monopolies and cartels and 
competitive markets. Industrial economics (later industrial organization), which studies the 
strategic behaviour of firms and the markets of imperfect competition, became eventually its 
own discipline within economics. Legal scholar and judge Bork has described this relationship 
between antitrust law and economics in words “antitrust is, first and most obviously, law” but 
 
8 Cournot 1838. 
9 Edgeworth 1897. 
10 Bertrand 1883. 
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it “is also a set of continually evolving theories about the economics of industrial 
organization”.11 
 
One of the important developments of the early industrial economics includes Chamberlin’s 
studies of the monopolistic competition. In 1933, Chamberlin presented a formal model in 
which firms engage in monopolistic practices.12 Even when there are multiple firms in a market, 
firms can become monopolists through product differentiation. Differentiated products are not 
perfect substitutes for each other. Because a monopoly is the only producer of a certain 
(differentiated) good, it can choose prices at its discretion. Monopolies therefore exercise 
significant market power (also called monopoly power in this context). The model results in an 
inefficient equilibrium in which marginal cost of the monopoly equals its marginal revenue. 
Chamberlin’s model demonstrates how monopolies have an incentive to maximise their profits 
by producing less of a good at a higher price than would be produced in competitive markets. 
 
Chamberlin established the base for the rise of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm which was the dominant industrial organization theory for thirty years, from the 
1940’s until the 1970’s. SCP paradigm was promoted by structuralist economists (originally) 
from Harvard University. The most prominent of these economists were Mason and Bain. 
Mason emphasised that the structure of the market is fundamental in explaining differences in 
competitive practices in different markets.13 Bain proposed that the market structure in many 
markets is characterised by high barriers to entry, such as entry costs, economies of scale and 
product-differentiation advantages, which reduce competitiveness and performance of the 
market.14 It was hypothesised that high entry barriers exist especially in capital-intensive, 
research and development (R&D) -intensive and advertising-intensive industries. 
 
The SCP paradigm thus focused on examining the market structure and entry barriers. Its thesis 
was that there is a causal relation between the market structure, conduct of firms and their 
performance.15 The market structure defines conduct of firms which, in turn, defines the 
performance of the market. The performance and conduct of firms, on the other hand, can 
influence market structure, and public policy can influence all of these elements. 
 
 
11 Bork 1993, p. 10. 
12 Chamberlin 1933. 
13 Mason 1939. 
14 Bain 1956. 
15 Bain 1959. 
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SCP paradigm condemned monopolies and believed that monopolistic competition and 
monopoly power was common. Its concern was that dominant firms could use pricing, vertical 
restrictions and intellectual property (IP) licensing practices to exclude other firms from 
profitable markets. Some structuralists also believed that market power gave firms leverage 
which they could use to expand their dominant position in one market into other markets. 
Influenced heavily by structuralist antitrust thought, antitrust policy in the United States became 
hostile towards vertical integration.16 
 
SCP paradigm was challenged by the Chicago School economists who promoted a contrary 
paradigm which built its foundation upon neoclassical price-theoretic models. The Chicago 
School economists contested the prevalence of monopolies and claimed that their presence was 
more often alleged than confirmed.17 According to them, market power could not persist 
because free entry to markets ensured that any monopolies would be temporary and that markets 
would remain competitive in the equilibrium. This argument was formalised by Baumol, Panzar 
and Willig in their contestable markets model. They showed that incumbent firms can make 
only normal profits when there are no entry or exit barriers, no sunk costs and no cost advantage 
over potential entrants.18 The intuition of their model is that, because of no sunk costs and low 
barriers to entry, the possibility of hit-and-run tactics by entrants drives prices to the competitive 
equilibrium. 
 
The Chicago School economists remarked that the SCP paradigm allowed another 
interpretation of monopolies. Large market shares of firms might not indicate exploitation of 
market power or barriers to entry but rather productive efficiency, such as low costs, achieved 
by the incumbent firms. The Chicago School economists suggested that there is wide range in 
the productive efficiency of firms within capital-intensive, advertising-intensive, and R&D-
intensive industries.19 Productive efficiency, rather than high entry barriers, might explain high 
concentration in these industries. 
 
The position of the Chicago School was not without its problems. It received critique of its own. 
Stiglitz showed that introducing even a small sunk cost for entrants in the contestable markets 
model leads to an equilibrium in which the incumbent firm makes monopoly profit.20 When 
 
16 Hovenkamp 2010, p. 616. 
17 Reder 1982, p. 15. 
18 Baumol, Banzar and Willig 1982. 
19 Baker and Bresnahan 2008, p. 24. 
20 Stiglitz 1987. 
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sunk costs exists, markets are no longer contestable. Schwartz, in turn, showed that entry and 
exit of potential entrants is unprofitable if the incumbent has the ability to change prices rapidly. 
He remarked that threat of entry is unlikely to be a reliable check on monopolistic behaviour in 
most markets.21 
 
The identification critique of the Chicago School economists, however, proved fatal to the SCP 
paradigm. As a result, empirical SCP models and methods were largely discarded in economics 
apart from studies relating price to market concentration. The SCP paradigm encountered 
problems also in its pursuit in showing correlation between market power and market 
concentration. These problems were partly caused by use of accounting profit as a measure of 
market performance.22 Economics and accounting calculate costs and profits differently which 
is why accounting rates of return differ from economic rates of return.23 These differences are 
caused especially by differences of the two disciplines in valuation of capital, depreciation and 
advertising and R&D investments, and by use of book values and pre-tax rates of return and 
lack of adjustment for risk, inflation and debt in accounting.24 For these reasons, accounting 
data may not be a reliable substitute for economic performance in analytic economic analysis 
and accounting rates of return are useful only insofar as they yield information as to economic 
rates of return.25 
 
The third approach to monopoly power was the view promoted by Schumpeter and some free-
market economists of the Austrian School. Schumpeter regarded innovation and “creative 
destruction” an inherent part of the capitalist economy and its evolution. In his theory, the 
process of creative destruction, which innovation is part of, is the driving force in the economy, 
incessantly destroying the old and creating a new.26 Innovation by entrepreneurs disrupts the 
economic equilibrium and creates new monopolies. Monopolies are thus a natural part of the 
economy and useful to the society as they promote innovation and investments. Like the 
Chicago School economists, Schumpeter regarded that individual monopolies were temporary, 
but not because they would necessary lead to a competitive equilibrium but because they were 
eventually to be replaced by other monopolies resulting from new innovations. Schumpeter’s 
 
21 Schwartz 1986, p. 55. 
22 Baker and Brenahan 2008, p. 24. 
23 See Fisher and McGowan 1983. 
24 See Perloff et al. 2007, pp. 15-18. 
25 Fisher and McGowan 1983, p. 82. 
26 Schumpeter 1962, p. 83. 
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ideas have been influential especially in innovation economics, which emphasises the role of 
entrepreneurs and innovation for the economic growth. 
 
After the Chicago School critique, the project to establish a general theoretical framework of 
competition in the manner of the SCP approach was largely abandoned. Much of the research 
in industrial organization focused on new areas, such as empirical studies of markets and 
transaction costs between and within firms. 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) studies market transactions and social costs related to them. 
TCE builds on the work of Coase and Williamson. In 1937, Coase proposed that firms exist to 
reduce transaction costs (or marketing costs in his terms) in the market. Without firms, 
organising production in the market would involve large bargaining costs between the owners 
of the factors of production. An authoritative decision-making structure of a firm removes the 
need to bargain and reduces these costs. Organising production within firms, however, involves 
costs as well. Coase therefore suggested that firms tend to expand until the costs of organising 
an extra transaction within the firm equal the cost of carrying out the same transaction in the 
open market.27 
 
Another major contribution of Coase was his theorem (as named by later authors) which he 
presented in 1960.28 Coase theorem states that if externalities29 can be traded and there are no 
transaction costs, an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved by bargaining. The initial 
allocation of property rights does not then affect the efficiency of the outcome. However, the 
important remark of the Coase theorem is that, because transaction costs are never zero in the 
real world, transaction costs (and hence, the initial allocation of property rights) matter for the 
efficient allocation of resources: 
 
“Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that [...] a 
rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production 
consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing 
it about.”30 
 
27 Coase 1937, p. 395. 
28 Coase 1960. 
29 ‘Externality’ is an external effect which is present when the utility of an individual depends not only on his own 
activities but on the activities of other individuals as well (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962, p. 372). Externalities 
can be positive or negative. For example, scientific research creates positive externalities as it increases the 
knowledge of all mankind and pollution creates negative externalities as the whole society suffers from the 
deterioration of the natural environment that pollution causes. 
30 Coase 1960, pp. 15-16. 
 
9 
 
 
Myerson and Satterthwaite have proven a strong impossibility theorem, similar to the more 
informal Coase theorem, which states that with imperfect information (i.e. one party does not 
know what other party knows), there can be no ex post efficient trading mechanism for a 
transaction of two parties (a buyer and a seller).31 This means that Coase theorem does not hold 
under imperfect information. Transactions between two parties hence always involve some 
inefficiencies which result from parties using their private information for their own gain. 
However, in a larger market, when there are more than two parties, inefficiencies asymptotically 
disappear (as the number of transacting parties approaches infinity).32 
 
If Coase is the grandparent of TCE, its parent is Williamson, who promoted the idea that 
transaction costs should be the basic unit of microeconomic analysis.33 Williamson analysed 
organisation of economic activity within and between markets and hierarchies and proposed 
that vertical integration is typically justified because it creates efficient (albeit complex) 
hierarchies and reduces transaction costs of production such as bargaining and monitoring 
costs.34 Contracts in vertical relationships of production become very complex and involve high 
transaction costs, which is why vertically integrated firms are often a more efficient form of 
governance in these instances. 
 
The contribution of TCE to antitrust thought has been that it has bridged the gap between 
industrial organization and organizational economics and established that vertical integration 
can be socially beneficial and create efficiencies. This has resulted in a more positive attitude 
toward vertical mergers and acquisitions in antitrust policy in the United States and Europe. 
 
Since the 1970’s, perhaps the most important development in the field of industrial organization 
has been the rise of game theory and its use in the study of the strategic behaviour of firms in 
markets. Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics which studies the strategic interaction 
of rational utility-maximising decision-makers (‘players’) in situations where the actions of one 
player depend on the actions of other players. This is the case in many imperfect markets, as in 
oligopolies, where there are at least two firms, which have market power, and whose common 
decisions affect prices. In making such decisions on production and prices, the profit-
maximising firms have to properly account for the similar decisions of other firms. This 
 
31 Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983. 
32 Rustichini et al. 1994. 
33 Hovenkamp 2010, p. 623. 
34 Williamson 1975. 
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strategic dimension of imperfect markets makes game theory a natural method to model 
competition in these instances and a useful tool in antitrust analysis. 
 
Game theory is based on the expected utility theory developed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem states that, under certain conditions 
and with assigned probabilities for different outcomes, utility functions can be formed from the 
individual’s preferences for these outcomes.35 The theorem makes it possible to compare the 
different choices of an individual by their expected utility in numerical form. 
 
In 1951, Nash formulated a solution concept, Nash equilibrium, to solve non-cooperative games 
in which commitments of the players outside the game are not binding. In a Nash equilibrium, 
the players’ strategies are best replies to each other. This means that no player has an incentive 
to unilaterally deviate from a Nash equilibrium. Nash showed that there exists a mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium for every finite game.36 However, there may be multiple Nash equilibria in a 
game, and, in these cases, it is usually not clear which equilibrium is the one where the players 
end up to. 
 
The most famous example of a non-cooperative game is Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which two 
prisoners are suspected of a crime. The prosecutor does not have enough evidence to charge 
them for a crime they are suspected of. The prosecutor, however, has enough evidence to charge 
them for a minor offence. The prosecutor interrogates prisoners separately. Each prisoner is 
offered a choice to confess the crime and testify against the other prisoner. If one prisoner 
confesses and testifies against the other but the other does not, the prisoner that confessed 
receives a minimum sentence while the other prisoner receives a considerably longer sentence. 
If neither confesses, prisoners are charged for a minor offence. If both confess, however, they 
both receive a long sentence. In this game, the Nash equilibrium strategy for each prisoner is to 
confess the crime although both prisoners would be better off by staying silent and not 
confessing the crime to the prosecutor. This outcome results from prisoners not being able to 
trust each other when they are interrogated separately. 
 
 
35 Neumann and Morgenstern 1944. 
36 Nash 1951. ‘Strategy’ means a set of actions for every contingency in a game. ‘Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium’ 
means a probability distribution over a set of “pure” strategies. For example, a choice to turn either left or right in 
a crossroads can be considered a choice between two pure strategies, and flipping a coin between these options 
can be thought of as a mixed strategy (by assigning 50 percent chance to turn left and 50 percent chance to turn 
right). 
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Game theory has widely transformed the economics. It has been incorporated into almost every 
aspect of mainstream microeconomics, including the field of industrial organization. Cournot 
equilibrium, for example, can be shown to be a special case of Nash equilibrium. Game theory 
has been applied, inter alia, successfully to the study of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
competition, barriers to entry, horizontal and vertical mergers, R&D investments, product 
differentiation and advertising and analysis of implicit collusion.37 For instance, it has been 
shown using game theoretic models that entry barriers do not result from costs only, as proposed 
by Bain and structuralists, but that they have roots in strategic interaction as well as in costs.38 
 
Modern empirical research in industrial organization utilises structural econometric models and 
micro-level statistical data on specific markets. Structural econometric models combine explicit 
economic theories with statistical models. The economic theory makes statements about how 
observable ‘exogenous’ explaining variables affect ‘endogenous’ explained variables after 
which a statistical model is derived from that theory by adding statistical assumptions.39 Factors 
that have contributed to the use of structural models and micro-level data include the decline of 
the SPC paradigm which coincided with Lucas critique in macroeconomics in the 1970’s. Lucas 
critiqued Keynesian macroeconomists for using highly aggregated historical data when 
studying relationships between macroeconomic variables, such as economic output and 
investment.40 Lucas remarked that Keynesian models of that time were not structural, that is, 
their underlying parameters were subject to change whenever economic policy changed, and 
that making predictions based on aggregated data without specifying the underlying parameters 
properly would produce inconsistent statistical estimates. Rather similar problems of 
interpretation lead to the decline of the SCP paradigm, as noted before. Following Lucas 
critique, macroeconomics began to establish itself upon microeconomic foundations by using 
behaviour of households as a basis of macroeconomic models. Likewise, empirical research in 
industrial organization moved away from the use of aggregated statistical macro-level data 
towards the use of micro-level market-specific data. 
 
Example of a non-structural (or reduced-form) econometric model is the Phillips Curve which 
famously describes the relationship between rates of change of wages and unemployment.41 
Using historical data from the United Kingdom in 1861-1957, Phillips empirically 
 
37 Lambertini 2006, p. 408. 
38 Baker and Bresnahan 2008, p. 24. 
39 Reiss and Wolak 2007, pp. 4281-4282. 
40 Lucas 1976. 
41 Phillips 1958. 
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demonstrated a negative correlation between these variables: when the change of wages 
increases, unemployment decreases, and vice versa. The same relationship exists also (trivially) 
between inflation and unemployment. 
 
The Phillips Curve implies that governments wishing to reduce unemployment should increase 
inflation. However, the problem with this conclusion is that the Phillips Curve is not time- or 
policy-invariant. The underlying parameters of the curve are not constant but subject to change. 
If monetary authorities increased inflation in hopes to influence the unemployment rate, firms 
would modify their inflation expectations accordingly to take into account the rising wages and 
hire fewer employees than they would with lower inflation. The relationship between inflation 
and unemployment can also be different in different times. Indeed, it is generally accepted that 
while there may be short-term correlation between inflation and unemployment, inflation has 
no permanent impact on unemployment. This means that the long-run Phillips Curve is a 
vertical line. 
 
Without added assumptions, the results of statistical models are usually open to different 
interpretations. This is especially true in empirical economic research where data is typically 
nonexperimental and all variables are not controllable.42 Reduced-form models capture the 
statistical relationship between different variables but their interpretation depends on the 
assumptions. Some assumptions are necessary for a linear regression model to have a causal 
economic interpretation as a production function, for example. Indeed, it is well-known in 
statistics that correlation does not imply causation. Typically, in empirical industrial 
organization research and antitrust analysis, however, researchers are interested in causal 
relationships such as how much a merger of two firms affects market prices compared to the 
alternative that the merger did not happen. Structural models allow these sorts of 
counterfactuals to be performed and they permit estimation of unobserved parameters, such as 
marginal costs, that could not otherwise be determined from nonexperimental data.43 
 
In conclusion, industrial organization have so far failed to provide a comprehensive theoretical 
framework of competition for the guidance of competition policy that would be applicable in 
most situations. As there are no general theory, which captures most of the relevant aspects of 
competition between firms, each case must be modelled and investigated separately. On the 
other hand, this ad hoc modeling frees the researcher to concentrate on the merits of the specific 
 
42 Reiss and Wolak 2007, p. 4301. 
43 Ibid, p. 4288. 
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models, that is, how well a model explains the specific phenomenon the researcher is interested 
in.44 The lack of a general theoretical framework and the multitude of different tools allows 
flexibility for the competition authorities and courts as well in applying antitrust law in the 
European Union and other jurisdictions. 
 
 Theory of two-sided markets 
 
Traditional industrial organization theory, which have been discussed above, concern 
competition between firms that operate in conventional one-sided markets, where producers 
and consumers engage in trade of goods and services. The same concerns most of the case law 
of courts and practice of competition authorities. However, the development of the information 
and communication technology and the rise of the Internet in recent decades have reduced costs 
of interaction and dissemination of information between people. This has created new markets, 
where strong network effects are present, and business models which try to capture these 
network effects by operating digital platforms. 
 
Economists call markets that involve distinct but related consumer groups with interdependent 
demand ‘two-sided markets’ and platforms that intermediate the interaction of these consumer 
groups ‘two-sided platforms’ or, in a case of more than two consumer groups, ‘multi-sided 
platforms’.45 Two-sided markets are characterised by indirect network effects which are 
externalities that arise from the interaction of the consumer groups. In general, network effects 
may be direct or indirect. ‘Direct network effects’ arise when the value of a product to a 
consumer depends on the number of other consumers using that product. For example, the 
utility that a consumer derives from joining a telephone network depends directly on the number 
of other consumers using that network. ‘Indirect network effects’ in turn arise when the value 
of a product to a consumer depends on the number of other consumers using a complementary 
product. For example, the utility that a consumer derives from purchasing a computer depends 
indirectly on the number of other consumers using that computer since the amount and variety 
of software developed for that computer hardware depends on the number of computers that 
have been sold.46 Indirect network effects are sometimes also called ‘cross-platform network 
effects’ in the context of two-sided platforms since those indirect network effects operate across 
the two sides of the platform. 
 
44 Shy 1995, p. 5. 
45 As is noted by OECD 2009, p. 23, insights concerning two-sided platforms generalise to multi-sided platforms. 
Hence, these two terms are treated interchangeably in this thesis. 
46 See Katz and Shapiro 1985, p. 424. 
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Two-sided markets became its own field of research when Rochet and Tirole published a 
working paper version of their article Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets47 in the early 
2000’s. In that paper, they formed a basic theory of two-sided markets and showed that, to 
succeed, platforms must get both sides of the market on board by choosing an optimal price 
structure instead of only an optimal price level. This pioneering work inspired further 
theoretical research, most notably from Caillaud and Jullien48, Armstrong49 and Weyl50 and 
from Rochet and Tirole51 themselves. For example, Caillaud and Jullien showed that an 
equilibrium with efficient market structure always exists under the assumption of efficient 
allocation of surplus. They also discussed business strategies such as a “divide-and-conquer” 
strategy in which one side of the market is subsidised while profits are made on the other side.52 
 
Today, the economic literature on two-sided markets includes hundreds of published papers 
and several major books. It has become a part of the mainstream industrial organization 
literature.53 Nevertheless, there are also profound questions which remain open. For example, 
there is no consensus on the definition of a two-sided market.54 Rochet and Tirole suggest that 
a market is two-sided if not only the price level but also the price structure matter for the volume 
of transactions: 
 
“[A] market is two-sided if the platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more 
to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in 
other words, the price structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on 
board. The market is one-sided if the end-users negotiate away the actual allocation of the burden 
(i.e., the Coase theorem applies); it is also one-sided in the presence of asymmetric information 
between buyer and seller, if the transaction between buyer and seller involves a price determined 
through bargaining or monopoly price-setting, provided that there are no membership 
externalities.”55 
 
 
47 Rochet and Tirole 2003. 
48 Caillaud and Jullien 2003. 
49 Armstrong 2006. 
50 Weyl 2010. 
51 Rochet and Tirole 2006. 
52 Caillaud and Jullien 2003, pp. 323-324. 
53 Evans and Schmalensee 2018, pp. 5-6. For a survey of the literature, see Evans and Schmalensee 2014. 
54 Katz and Sallet 2018, p. 2148. 
55 Rochet and Tirole 2006, pp. 664-665. 
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The Coase theorem not applying is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for a two-sided 
market. This means that the market is not necessarily two-sided if the Coase theorem did not 
apply. If the Coase theorem did apply, however, the price structure of the platform would be 
neutral, that is, the price structure would not matter to the economic output of the platform.56  
 
Weyl in turn has observed that the classic models of two-sided markets usually have three 
common features. First, they involve a multi-product firm which provide services to two sides 
of a market that can be charged different prices. Second, there are cross-platform network 
effects present in the market: utility of a user depends on the participation of users on the other 
side of the market. Third, platforms have bilateral market power which means that they are 
price setters on both sides of the market.57 
 
Katz and Sallet have critisised Rochet and Tirole’s definition of being too broad and therefore 
unfit for the purposes of antitrust analysis.58 However, Katz and Sallet remark that a lack of a 
consensus definition may not be that important in antitrust analysis because in their view “the 
potential anti-competitive effects of challenged conduct and the firm’s competitive 
environment, rather than inherently imprecise labels, should be the focus of antitrust 
analysis”.59 Indeed, the two-sided nature of a market is rather a matter of degree than binary 
variable: depending on the strength of cross-platform network effects, sometimes it might be a 
critical feature for competitive analysis and other times it might be irrelevant.60 Consequently, 
as Katz and Sallet argue, it would not be sensible to adopt a competition policy that varies 
according to which label is attached to the platform firm.61 
 
Pricing strategies of platforms differ significantly from firms in traditional one-sided markets. 
In principle, platforms may charge consumers for transactions (usage) or access (membership) 
or both. A platform may charge membership fees especially if it is unable to charge for usage 
(for example, because the interaction of the user groups is not be observed), or to recoup its 
fixed costs by capturing end-user surplus.62 Rochet and Tirole show that the standard Lerner 
pricing formula63 (according to which a profit-maximising monopoly chooses its prices) can be 
 
56 Ibid, p. 649. 
57 Weyl 2010, p. 1644. 
58 Katz and Sallet 2018, p. 2149-2150. 
59 Ibid, p. 2151. 
60 OECD 2009, p. 28. 
61 Katz and Sallet 2018, p. 2170. 
62 Rochet and Tirole 2006, pp. 651-652. 
63 The Lerner index, as formulated by Lerner 1934, is a firm's percentage markup (a price minus a marginal cost 
divided by the price). It measures a firm's market power on a scale from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly). 
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reinterpreted in two-sided markets by replacing marginal cost with ‘opportunity cost’.64 With 
this reinterpretation, pricing in two-sided markets follows the standard Lerner principles.65 In 
monopoly settings, platforms subsidise the user group with a high price elasticity of demand66 
and charge more to other groups to attract as many users as possible.67 Rochet and Tirole call 
this the “seesaw principle”: 
 
“[A] factor that is conducive to a high price on one side, to the extent that it raises the platform's 
margin on that side, tends also to call for a low price on the other side as attracting members on 
that other side becomes more profitable. Accordingly, it is quite common for a platform to charge 
below-cost (perhaps zero) prices to one side and high prices to the other.”68 
 
These principles allow platforms to internalise externalities that arise from the interaction of 
the user groups on different sides of the platform. However, Weyl has shown that, if there is 
user heterogeneity, these externalities are internalised imperfectly, as only the preferences of 
marginal users are taken into account by the platforms.69 
 
There are also other important aspects, such as user multi-homing, which affect the optimality 
of the price structure and market outcomes. ‘Multi-homing’ means that a user uses multiple 
platforms whereas ‘single-homing’ means that a user uses only one platform. It is possible that 
both sides of the platform multi-home or that only one side of the platform multi-homes. 
Likewise, it is possible that both sides of the platform single-home.70 In general, homing 
decisions on one side of the platform depend on homing decisions on the other side of the 
platform.71 Armstrong illustrates this with an example that if everyone who speak French as a 
native language speak also English, then native English speakers have less incentive to learn 
French.72 
 
 
According to the monopoly pricing formula (see e.g. Belleflamme and Peitz 2010, p. 27), a monopolist firm 
chooses a price such that its Lerner index is the inverse of the elasticity of demand. However, as elasticity of 
demand or marginal costs are not observable, it is in practice very difficult to estimate market power by using the 
Lerner index. The Lerner Index is also problematic in industries with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, such 
as the computer software industry (see Baker and Bresnahan 2008, p. 35, note 57). 
64 Rochet and Tirole 2006, p. 665. 
65 Ibid, p. 658. 
66 Price elasticity of demand is the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good to changes in its price. 
67 See Armstrong 2006, pp. 671-673. 
68 Rochet and Tirole 2006, p. 659. 
69 Weyl 2010, p. 1658. 
70 Armstrong 2006, p. 669. 
71 Franck and Peitz 2019, p. 57. 
72 Armstrong 2006, p. 669. 
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Multi-homing has significant effects for the platform’s pricing power which depends on 
competitive conditions on both sides of the platform.73 If one side of the platform single-homes 
and the other side multi-homes, a competitive bottleneck might be created where the platform 
holds monopoly power over providing the multi-homing users access to the single-homing 
users. As in traditional markets, this monopoly power results in higher prices for the multi-
homing users. However, these higher prices may not lead to monopoly profits as the platform 
is forced to compete fiercely for the single-homing users. Thus, profits might be passed on to a 
significant extent to the single-homing users in the form of low or zero prices.74 In such a case, 
single-homing users end up receiving a larger share of the joint surplus than the multi-homing 
side.75 
 
Because of these idiosyncrasies of two-sided markets, the results of orthodox economic theory 
might not hold in their competitive analysis. For example, welfare effects of price increases in 
two-sided markets cannot be established without considering also network effects. Song has 
simulated effects of mergers between media platforms by using data on TV magazines in 
Germany from 1992 to 2010 and shown that mergers in these markets are less harmful to readers 
and advertisers than what a one-sided market model would predict.76 As magazines typically 
set copy prices for magazine readers below marginal costs and make profits from advertising, 
platforms are usually expected to charge higher advertising fees to advertisers after mergers.77 
Despite higher prices, advertisers are not necessarily worse off if lower copy prices attract more 
readers and thus increase advertisers’ willingness to pay for advertising.78 This shows that 
welfare effects of changes in the price structure are not necessarily negative even for those user 
groups of a platform that suffer from price increases but they rather depend on the presence of 
network effects and their sign and magnitude. 
 
Wright discusses eight basic fallacies that can arise from using conventional wisdom from one-
sided markets in two-sided markets.79 He uses (heterosexual) nightclubs as an example to 
illustrate these questions as they exemplify many qualities of two-sided markets. Nightclubs, 
much like online dating services, facilitate meeting of two different types of customers, in this 
case men and women. In addition, their markets are often competitive, as there are usually many 
 
73 Evans 2003, p. 359. 
74 Armstrong 2006, pp. 669-670. 
75 Rochet and Tirole 2003, p. 660. 
76 Song 2019. 
77 Ibid, p. 39. 
78 Ibid, p. 7. 
79 Wright 2004. 
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nightclubs in any given area. Setting them up is also quite straightforward, as there are only 
small barriers to entry and exit.80 
 
Wright notes that one trait of nightclubs is that users may not only prefer more of the opposite 
type of users, but they may also prefer less of the same type of users.81 This means that men 
prefer nightclubs with more women and less men as patrons while women conversely prefer 
clubs with more men and less women as patrons. Network effects then are such that increase in 
the number of the opposite type incurs a positive externality for a given type whereas increase 
in the number of the same type incurs a negative externality. 
 
The first fallacy is that an efficient price structure should be set to reflect relative costs.82 This 
is also known as the user-pays principle. It means that a user pays all the costs of the product 
or service which is consumed. In the case of nightclubs, the cost of service for men and women 
are likely to be equal. Hence, under the user-pays principle, men and women should pay the 
same fee for entry. In jurisdictions where it is legal, however, nightclubs use differential pricing 
strategies, charging more from men than women to enter.83 This price discrimination might 
imply that men, on average, care more about the number of women in the club and value their 
presence more than vice versa. The magnitude of the network effects is thus different for 
different groups. If prices for men and women were equal, the expected number of men would 
be greater or at least as great than the number of women. If women were offered discounted 
price, however, more women would show up to a nightclub which would then attract more men, 
even with higher prices. The user-pays principle thus might not lead to an efficient equilibrium. 
Wright concludes that efficient structure of fees reflects network effects and surplus that 
different groups derive instead of only relative costs.84 
 
Wright also notes that a general theoretical result of economics, which states that prices equal 
marginal cost in competitive markets, might not hold in two-sided markets.85 Even if there were 
many nightclubs in a competitive market with no legal restraints for pricing, the structure of 
fees for men and women might still be different which would suggest that price for men is 
above and price for women is below marginal cost. Competition between platforms thus does 
 
80 Ibid, p. 46. 
81 Ibid, p. 46, note 2. Wright also remarks that homosexual nightclubs are an example of a normal one-sided 
network as their patrons are interested only in their own type and do not care about the opposite type. 
82 Ibid, p. 47. 
83 Ibid, p. 46, note 3. 
84 Ibid, p. 47. 
85 Ibid, p. 47. 
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not affect structure of fees and might not lead to an equilibrium in which the prices would equal 
marginal cost. 
 
The second fallacy that Wright discusses is that a high price-cost margin indicates market 
power.86 An observation that nightclubs set prices for men above marginal cost might lead to a 
conclusion that nightclubs have market power over men. Wright remarks that this is a false 
identification of market power. Identifying market power based on a price-cost margin is 
problematic in case of two-sided markets because the assumed presence of market power does 
not necessarily relate to any restriction of output, ability to restrict competition, more general 
market failure, or any deviation from the perfectly competitive benchmark for nightclubs. In 
order to show the existence of market power, one would need to take into account both sides of 
the market and show that the sum of fees to men and women could be profitably raised above 
the sum of costs of service to both of them.87 This conclusion leads directly to a third fallacy 
Wright discusses. 
 
The third fallacy is that a price below marginal cost indicates predation.88 Predatory pricing, in 
which a firm tries to drive a competitor out of the market by setting a very low price, is 
considered anticompetitive behaviour in many jurisdictions. Sometimes merely expected 
predatory behaviour from an incumbent firm might create a barrier to entry to the market for 
new entrants.  A price that is set below marginal cost permanently is often presumed predatory 
in antitrust law. Below-cost prices in case of two-sided markets, however, may be used to 
generate greater surplus by attracting those kinds of users that provide greater benefits to the 
other users.89 It is customary for platforms to subsidise one side of the market at the expense of 
the other in order to maximise the value of the platform. Based on this common price 
discrimination, it would be unreasonable to conclude that low prices on one side of the market 
indicate predation. 
 
The fourth fallacy is that an increase in competition necessarily results in a more efficient 
structure of prices.90 As was already noted above in case of nightclubs, increased competition 
may not affect the structure of prices at all. Rochet and Tirole have shown that under 
assumptions of linear demand and non-strategic behaviour, the price structure of a monopoly 
 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid, p. 48. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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platform and multiple competing platforms is the same.91 It is not clear that competition 
between platforms will result in an efficient price structure. Wright notes that while competition 
will generally lower the total level of costs charged to different sides of the market, it will not 
necessarily lower the price charged to one side relative to the other side.92 
 
The fifth fallacy is that an increase in competition necessarily results in a more balanced price 
structure. As with the fourth fallacy, the outcome of competition is uncertain. Competition 
between platforms could lead to a more balanced price structure or then it could not. The 
outcome depends on demands and types of users.93 The effects of competition thus must be 
analysed separately in each case. 
 
The sixth fallacy is that in mature markets (or networks), price structures that do not reflect 
costs are no longer justified. According to this fallacy, pricing below cost for some types of 
users may be justified when the platform is starting up and needs to get both sides of the market 
on board but that such pricing is no longer justified when the platform is well established.94 
Indeed, nightclubs and shopping malls, among other two-sided markets, use promotional offers 
when they open to attract new customers and to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem.95 
However, differential pricing structures might be efficient for the market afterwards as well, as 
was discussed earlier, which renders the argument fallacious. 
 
The seventh fallacy is that where one side of a two-sided market receives services below 
marginal cost, it must be receiving a cross-subsidy from users on the other side.96 A cross-
subsidisation means that one group of customers is charged higher price so that the prices of 
another group could be lowered. In cross-subsidisation, one group is thus favored at the expense 
of the other. If men pay more than women to enter a nightclub then one might (fallaciously) 
conclude that men are cross-subsidising women. Wright remarks, however, that if there was 
such a cross-subsidy flowing from men to women, it would necessarily result in that men would 
be better off if women were banned altogether from the nightclub. This move would, of course, 
reduce revenues of the nightclub and likely drive it out of business as a rival nightclub could be 
set up to profitably undercut it. The logic of the fallacy ignores the interdependence and network 
 
91 Rochet and Tirole 2003. 
92 Wright 2004, p. 49. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid, note 9. 
96 Ibid, p. 50. 
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effects between different groups. Because of these factors, the revenue from each group will 
cover their incremental costs, and hence there is no cross-subsidisation.97 
 
The eight fallacy is that regulating prices set by a platform in a two-sided market is 
competitively neutral.98 A regulation of a firm is competitively neutral if it does not provide 
any competitive advantage for rival unregulated firms. Price regulation in traditional industries, 
which are sufficiently competitive, may be competitively neutral because when regulation 
reduces prices of one firm, for example, then other firms must follow it by reducing their prices 
or lose customers. In case of regulation of two-sided markets, however, an unregulated platform 
may not wish to adopt the pricing structure of the regulated platform, if the latter is suboptimal. 
This may provide the unregulated platform a competitive advantage in relation to the regulated 
platform.99 
 
 Market definition in antitrust analysis 
 
The assessment of market power in antitrust and merger analysis typically begins with the 
definition of the relevant market. Market definition is not an end itself but rather “a tool in the 
investigation of market power”.100 According to OECD Roundtable on Market Definition, it 
serves to identify the strength of the competitive constraints a firm faces and to assess the 
existence, the creation or the strengthening of market power and the likelihood of possible 
anticompetitive effects.101 International Competition Network (ICN) Merger Working Group 
has likewise noted that market definition is important firstly because “the exercise of defining 
markets provides a useful analytical framework in which to organise the analysis of the effects 
of the merger on competition” and secondly because “market shares - the most widely used 
proxy for the determination of the absence or possible existence of market power - can be 
calculated only after the scope of the market has been defined”.102 
 
Ferro has noted that “economists tend to see market definition as a necessary evil, an imperfect 
instrument to arrive at an end which would, ideally, be reached through methods of direct 
assessment of market power”.103 Indeed, as academic economists have developed a number of 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid, p. 51. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Easterbrook 1984, p. 22. 
101 OECD 2012, p. 29. 
102 ICN 2006, Worksheet A, para 4. 
103 Ferro 2019, p. 2. 
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econometric techniques for measuring market power104, direct evidence has become an 
important alternative to the traditional method of inferring market power from market shares.105 
However, as direct methods usually use estimates of demand elasticities, which are difficult to 
determine precisely in practice due to constraints of time and data, competition authorities are 
often forced to rely on indirect methods for assessing market power.106 Market delineation is 
useful for this purpose because the relevant market separates active forces of competition from 
passive forces in the background, thus in principle capturing that which is relevant for the 
competitive analysis.107 
 
However, use of market shares as a proxy for market power is highly problematic in two-sided 
markets.108 Even in one-sided markets, market shares do not account for the dynamic nature of 
markets and entry of potential competitors. Especially in technology-intensive industries, 
market shares might overstate market power of a firm which has a high market share but is 
vulnerable to dynamic entry.109 Typically, market shares are used to provide an indication of 
the market structure and also to calculate market concentration measures and competition 
indices, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)110. A theoretical justification for the 
HHI (and market shares) is that in the Cournot model of competition in which firms produce a 
homogeneous product and simultaneously choose an amount of production there is a positive 
correlation between market concentration and market power as measured by the Lerner index, 
that is, a firm's percentage markup.111 The standard Cournot model and its conditions obviously 
do not apply to two-sided platforms whose pricing power on each side of the platform depends 
on competitive conditions on both sides.112 Moreover, it is not clear how revenue-based market 
shares should be measured or interpreted in case of zero prices on one side of the platform.113 
For these reasons, competition authorities should focus their efforts on examination of other 
factors contributing to market power such as barriers to entry, especially as network effects 
might often form such a barrier to entry in two-sided markets.114 
 
104 See e.g. Bresnahan 1989 for a survey of econometric techniques for estimating market power which do not rely 
on market definition. 
105 Baker and Bresnahan 2008, p. 15. 
106 OECD 2012, p. 26. 
107 Werden 2012, p. 739. 
108 Evans 2003, p. 359. 
109 Whish and Bailey 2018, p. 7. 
110 HHI is a sum of the squared market shares of all the firms in the market and it receives values from 0 (lowest 
possible concentration) to 10 000 (a monopoly). It gives more weight to firms with large market shares, thus 
reflecting the contribution of individual firms for market concentration better than some other measures. 
111 OECD 2012, p. 26. See e.g. Cabral 2000, pp. 154-156. 
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Although market shares might be all but useless for the competitive analysis of many two-sided 
platforms, market definition might serve that analysis well by providing a framework for it. 
Market definition has evolved from identifying interchangeability of products based on their 
characteristics to recognising competitive constraints a firm or a merged firm faces.115 These 
competitive constraints, demand and supply substitutability, are imposed upon a firm by 
consumers or other firms. Demand-side substitution is the most important and immediate of 
these constraints. Its purpose is to identify products which the consumers view as substitutes 
for each other. Supply-side substitution, on the other hand, examines whether there are firms 
that could readily switch their production in short term to substitutable products. Compared to 
demand substitution, supply-side substitution is of secondary importance in defining relevant 
markets and it depends from jurisdiction whether it is considered at the market definition stage 
or later when assessing competitive effects.116 Considering supply substitution at market 
definition stage broadens the relevant market and may lead to analytical errors if competitive 
effects analysis is not conducted carefully.117 When the relevant market is defined too broadly, 
it is possible that competitive constraints that in fact do not substantially constrain the behaviour 
of firms are taken into account and thus market power may be understated. By contrast, when 
the relevant market is defined too narrowly, there is a risk that important competitive constraints 
are not accounted for and hence market power may be overstated.118 
 
Defining relevant markets includes two parts: determining relevant product markets and 
relevant geographic markets. The most widely employed test to do this is the ‘hypothetical 
monopolist test’ which is also known as the ‘SSNIP test’.119 In this test, a hypothetical 
monopolist, a producer of goods located in a geographic region, is considered to impose a small 
but significant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) for its product, typically in the 
range from 5 to 10 percent. If it is likely that a profit-maximising hypothetical monopolist would 
impose such an increase in price (the US version) or if such an increase in price is profitable 
(the EU version), then the products included in this market are considered substitutes for the 
product in question and the relevant market is defined as the combination of the product and 
geographic markets. If such an increase is not likely to be imposed or profitable, however, the 
next closest substitutes are added to the market and the test is repeated until the increase in price 
 
115 Evans and Schmalensee 2018, p. 12, note 28. 
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is profitable. Ultimately, the relevant market comprises of the smallest set of products and 
regions in which the price increase is profitable. 
 
The logic behind the SSNIP test is quite intuitive. If even a monopolist could not profitably 
increase the price above the competitive level, firms which are not monopolists would certainly 
not be able to do so either. If that is the case, firms will not have any market power and any 
market shares determined in the market will be meaningless.120 The SSNIP test thus identifies 
markets which are worth monopolising. It is useful as a thought experiment or a conceptual tool 
(as it is most often employed in practice) but even more so as an econometric exercise if data 
and time are sufficiently available. In the latter case, the SSNIP test often involves estimating 
a firm’s own-price elasticity of demand and comparing it with a critical elasticity of demand 
which (in the EU) is the value of price elasticity of demand that would leave a monopolist’s 
profits unchanged following a price increase. If the firm’s own-price elasticity of demand is 
less than the critical elasticity, the increase in price is profitable and the relevant market is 
defined.121  
 
An alternative, more popular method to perform the SSNIP test is the ‘Critical Loss Analysis’ 
(CLA). CLA estimates the ‘critical loss’ which is a measure for a firm’s loss in sales of a good 
that would leave its profits unchanged following an increase in a good’s price. If the critical 
loss exceeds the expected loss of sales (the ‘actual loss’) following an identical price increase, 
then the increase in price is profitable and the relevant market is defined.122 Under assumptions 
of linear or constant elasticity of demand and constant marginal costs, the critical loss formulas 
are equivalent to critical elasticity formulas in analysis.123 
 
The hypothetical monopolist test was first introduced by the US Department of Justice in its 
1982 Merger Guidelines.124 Subsequently, it has been embraced by the competition authorities 
all over the world. The European Commission formally established the SSNIP test as part of its 
market definition practice in antitrust and merger cases in its Notice on the definition of relevant 
 
120 OECD 2012, p. 30. 
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122 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 329, note 127. 
123 For a critique on critical loss analysis, see e.g. Katz and Shapiro 2003. For derivation of critical elasticity of 
demand and critical loss formulas, see Werden 1998, pp. 410-412, Appendix A. It should be noted that slightly 
different but equivalent versions of the formulas are in use in the EU and the US due to different versions of the 
SSNIP test used in these jurisdictions (these are called the break-even and the profit-maximisation critical 
elasticity/critical loss, respectively). 
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market for the purposes of [EU] competition law (the ‘Notice on Market Definition’)125 in 1997. 
Despite its usefulness, there are however some circumstances where the SSNIP test (at least 
without adjustments) may not be an appropriate tool for defining relevant markets. 
 
A well-known problem in application of SSNIP test to monopolisation or abuse of dominance 
cases is the ‘cellophane fallacy’, an error of inclusion of false substitutes in the relevant market, 
which the US Supreme Court committed in United States v. Du Pont & Co.126 in 1956. The 
case concerned a US company du Pont which produced cellophane, a unique packaging 
material, the production of which was protected by different patents. During the relevant period 
of the case, du Pont produced almost 75 percent of the cellophane sold in the United States, 
while cellophane constituted less than 20 percent of all sales in flexible packaging material. The 
US Department of Justice had charged du Pont with monopolising the cellophane market in 
violation of the Sherman Act. Affirming the lower court ruling and against dissenting minority 
opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that cellophane was interchangeable with other flexible 
packaging materials, on which basis it defined the relevant market to be the market for flexible 
packaging materials, and that competition from these other packaging materials prevented du 
Pont from possessing monopoly power in sales of cellophane. 
 
The mistake of the Supreme Court which lead it to define the relevant market too widely was 
to ignore the possibility that du Pont was already charging the monopoly price in the cellophane 
market and that any inferences from this prevailing price level regarding the substitutability of 
the products in question were biased. To avoid this error, the Supreme Court should have used 
a counterfactual estimate of competitive price instead. This failure caused the Supreme Court 
to conclude erroneously that the cross-elasticity of demand127 of cellophane (at the competitive 
price level) was high when in fact it was low. Economists Stocking and Mueller, critisising the 
lower court ruling, pointed out that the relevant market for cellophane was narrower than the 
flexible packaging materials and that cellophane was so differentiated from other flexible 
wrapping materials that its cross elasticity of demand gave du Pont significant and continuing 
monopoly power which du Pont exercised “with foresight and wisdom” in its pricing policies 
to maximise its earnings.128 
 
125 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 
published in OJ 97/C 372/03. 
126 United States v. Du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
127 Cross-elasticity of demand is the responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good to price changes of another 
good. 
128 Stocking and Mueller 1955, p. 63. 
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The United States v. Du Pont & Co case demonstrates well the decisive role market definition 
often plays in antitrust analysis. Different definitions of the relevant market are likely to lead to 
different outcomes in cases, especially when great emphasis is given to market shares. This is 
one of the reasons why market definition has been regularly criticised in the literature. Some 
authors have proposed that market definition process should be abandoned entirely because in 
their view meaningful inferences of market power in redefined markets cannot be made nor it 
is possible to determine what market definition is best without first formulating a best estimate 
of market power, rendering further analysis pointless and possibly leading to erroneous 
outcomes.129 Others have contested these propositions and their premises by arguing that 
market definition serves a useful purpose of identifying the competitive process at issue rather 
than simply measuring market shares and that market delineation does not require any prior 
assessment of market power.130 
 
Some markets, however, exhibit special features which must be accounted for when defining 
relevant markets. This is the case with two-sided markets where market definition is more 
complicated because of indirect network effects between the groups interacting on the 
platform.131 
 
Firstly, there is the issue of how many markets should be defined. Obviously, there are two 
sides to a market in a two-sided market but it is not trivial whether one ‘two-sided’ market or 
two separate but ‘interrelated’ markets should be defined. The former is called a ‘single-market 
approach’ and the latter a ‘multiple-markets approach’. The literature is divided between these 
approaches with respect to certain types of platforms but not others. For example, in case of 
advertising-supported media markets, there is a broad consensus that defining two distinct but 
interrelated markets is preferable to defining a single market.132 This is mainly due to a reason 
that products on different sides of the platform may not be substitutes for each other (e.g. 
reading a newspaper is not a substitute for purchasing advertising).133 By contrast, there are 
divergent views regarding transaction platforms, such as payment card systems, which are 
characterized by the presence and observability of a transaction between the two groups of 
 
129 Kaplow 2010. 
130 Werden 2012. 
131 OECD 2012, p. 57. 
132 Katz and Sallet 2018, pp. 2154-2155. 
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users.134 It has been argued that a transaction provided by these platforms is a service that, by 
its very nature, must be jointly consumed by two parties and cannot be separately provided to 
one or the other.135 The debate between the approaches, then, is not about that the multi-sided 
markets approach is invalid but whether it should be complemented by the single-market 
approach in some cases. 
 
Filistrucchi et al. have promoted the single-market approach by proposing that in two-sided 
transaction markets, only one market should be defined.136 According to them, defining a single 
market in this case means defining the market for services to a transaction where the offered 
product is the possibility to transact through the platform.137 Conversely, in two-sided non-
transaction markets, two interrelated markets need to be defined in accordance with the 
multiple-markets approach.138 In both of these cases, competition authorities should take into 
account both sides of the market when defining the relevant market. Ignoring the other side is 
acceptable only in a two-sided non-transaction market where that other side exerts no 
externality on the other.139 
 
A result of defining only one relevant market is that a platform would be either on both sides 
of the market or on none. In case of two interrelated markets, by contrast, it is possible that a 
platform could be on one side of the market but not on the other.140 Filistrucchi et al. give as an 
example a payment card firm: 
 
“Everyone would probably agree that a payment card company such as American Express is either 
in the relevant market on both sides or on neither side, for the reason that either the transaction 
between the buyer and the merchant takes place using American Express services on both sides, 
or it does not take place through American Express.”141 
 
Evans and Noel have similarly proposed that a single two-sided market should be defined when 
the two sides of the market are highly complementary and closely linked and all the other 
platforms in that industry also serve the same two sides.142 This description fits transaction-
 
134 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 298. 
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platforms, such as payment card systems, but also some non-transaction matching platforms, 
such as (heterosexual) nightclubs and dating services where transactions may not be observable. 
Following the suggestion of Filistrucchi et al., these markets should be defined as two separate 
but interdependent markets. However, it does not make sense to talk about separate markets for 
men and women in this case.143 The product that a platform offers herein to both sides is the 
opportunity to find a match. The platform cannot observe whether a transaction takes place and 
hence cannot charge any transaction fee. Because the product is identical and there are similar 
substitution possibilities for both sides, it would appear reasonable to define a single two-sided 
market in these cases.144 Consequently, basing the choice between the single-market and the 
multiple-markets approach on whether transactions are observable, as suggested by Filistrucchi 
et al., simplifies the choice too much. 
 
Katz and Sallet have criticised the single-market approach and proposed that multiple-markets 
approach should be used in all two-sided market delineation cases, including that of transaction 
markets. They make two broad arguments against the single-market approach. Firstly, even in 
transaction platforms, services offered to users on different sides of the platform are generally 
not substitutes and therefore cannot be in the same relevant market.145 One reason for this is 
that the interests of different parties to the transaction may not be fully aligned. In case of credit 
cards, for example, merchants and consumers have partly divergent interests. Each group is 
interested only in their own utility (merchants in lowering interchange fees and consumers in 
increasing their rewards from using a certain card) while neither are interested in the net two-
sided price a credit card company charges to them both.146 Secondly, if a single market is 
defined, different competitive conditions (such as product differentiation, vertical integration, 
user sophistication and multi-homing) on the two sides of a transaction platform cannot be taken 
into account. In credit card markets, for instance, merchants typically multi-home (accepting 
many different credit cards) whereas consumers often single-home (usually owning only one 
or two credit cards).147 It is well-established in the economic literature that platforms compete 
more fiercely to attract single-homing users than multi-homing users by charging higher prices 
from the multi-homing side and, to a large extent, passing the profits made on that side to the 
 
143 Evans and Noel 2005, p. 671. 
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single-homing side in the form of low or zero prices.148 Therefore, in markets where one side 
multi-homes and the other side single-homes, it might not make much sense to speak of the 
competitiveness of the market when there are in fact two markets: the competitive market for 
single-homing users and a market for multi-homing users where each platform holds a local 
monopoly.149 
 
Franck and Peitz have joined these concerns and claimed that theoretical conditions when 
single-market approach might work are so severe that these conditions limit its application in 
practice to rare circumstances. Hence, there is a risk that courts and authorities would apply the 
single-market approach erroneously. Franck and Peitz hold that the multiple-markets approach 
is more flexible instrument than single-market approach as it takes into account different market 
conditions and substitution possibilities on the two sides of the platform which are not captured 
when a single market is defined.150 For example, in a ride-hailing platform Uber, which matches 
drivers and passengers and observes whether transactions between these groups take place, 
passengers and drivers have different substitution possibilities. Instead of Uber, passengers may 
use a classic taxi service, their own car, public transport or in some cases they may choose to 
walk. These substitution possibilities are not available to a driver.151  
 
Wismer et al. do not discard the single-market approach entirely but concur that its application 
seems feasible only if a platform’s service necessarily involves all groups on different sides of 
the platform and if substitution possibilities for each customer group do no differ substantially. 
Otherwise, the multiple-markets approach is more appropriate.152 In particular, they hold, it 
seems more appropriate to define separate markets for each customer group if competitive 
conditions are significantly different between these groups.153 
 
The view of Wismer et al. is consistent with the position taken by the German competition 
authority Bundeskartellamt (with which they are affiliated) in its Working Paper on Market 
Power of Platforms and Networks, which addresses the issue of market definition in the context 
of matching platforms and audience-providing platforms.154 The Bundeskartellamt therein 
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adopted the view that defining a single market is suitable for matching platforms if user groups 
have the same need to interact with each other and if their substitution possibilities do not differ 
substantially. The reasoning behind this is that the product of a matching platform is indivisible 
yet always includes both user groups. In these circumstances, considering the different sides of 
the platform separately would not adequately reflect transactions and the interdependencies 
between the two sides.155 However, to the extent that the substitution possibilities are obviously 
different, separate markets should be defined for user groups.156 In addition, if there are 
different competitive conditions on the two sides of the platform (e.g. single-homing users on 
one side and multi-homing users on the other side), defining separate markets might be justified 
also in case of matching platforms.157 Separate markets should also be defined for audience-
providing platforms (advertising-financed Internet services in particular), which are generally 
characterised by asymmetrical indirect network effects between the user groups (i.e. a user side 
may produce a strong positive indirect network effect to the advertising-side but not necessarily 
vice versa).158 
 
Despite the debate between the single-market and multiple-markets approaches, the definition 
of the relevant market as a single ‘two-sided’ market or two ‘interrelated’ markets may not need 
to be decisive if the sides and markets are treated interchangeably in the competitive analysis.159 
Many empirical methods of economics for estimating market power do not rely on market 
definition at all, which is often more important for legal proceedings than economic analysis. 
Indeed, it should be remembered that market definition is only a tool in the investigation of 
market power, as reminded by Katz and Sallet: 
 
“Given that formal market definition is not a prerequisite to sound analysis, one should be wary 
of arguments that a particular choice of formal boundaries inevitably dooms one to reaching 
incorrect conclusions. Instead, antitrust enforcers and courts should employ market definition, in 
accordance with its intended purpose: as a means by which to assist the assessment of market 
power and competitive harms in conjunction with all of the relevant evidence.”160  
 
 
by all user groups” whereas an audience-providing platform is “a platform that enables one user group to attract 
the attention of another user group” (ibid, p. 21). Transaction platforms are a subgroup of matching platforms.  
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That being said, when formal definition of the relevant market is required or helpful for the 
competitive analysis, the position of the Bundeskartellamt outlined above serves as a good 
baseline and guidance for deciding between the two approaches when defining the relevant 
market in two-sided markets. It is clear from the literature that multiple-markets approach 
should be the default option in most market delineation cases as the theoretical conditions for 
the use of the single-market approach are rather restrictive (in summary, a platform must offer 
an intermediation service which requires participation of all user groups and which cannot be 
offered to these groups separately while substitution possibilities and competitive conditions 
on different sides of the platform must be similar). 
 
However, when these conditions are fulfilled, the single-market approach should be used 
instead of the multiple-markets approach. The value of the single-market approach vis-à-vis the 
multiple-markets approach is that it appropriately captures the nature of an intermediation 
service as a substitutable product where such a service really is the “product” provided by a 
platform. Another (more practical) benefit of the single-market approach is that defining a 
single market simplifies the analysis of competitive effects in already complicated two-sided 
settings. This may be helpful for competition authorities who are always short on time in their 
investigations, which is a matter ignored by Katz and Sallet and Franck and Peitz. The purpose 
of market definition, after all, is to recognize the most important competitive constraints a firm 
faces which can then be taken into account when assessing market power in later analysis. 
 
Furthermore, a choice between the two approaches cannot be based on a simple categorisation 
of a platform as a transaction or non-transaction platform, as suggested by Filistrucchi et al., as 
it is possible to identify transaction platforms, where defining separate markets instead of a 
single market may be desirable, and non-transaction platforms, where defining a single market 
instead of separate markets may be preferable. Instead, a more detailed examination of a 
platform under investigation is required before deciding which approach should be followed. 
 
The second problem, which must be addressed when defining the relevant market in two-sided 
markets, is related to the SSNIP test which was originally developed for one-sided markets. In 
two-sided markets, the SSNIP test must be adjusted to account for the network effects present 
on the platform. Applying the standard single-sided SSNIP test without accounting for the 
feedback effects might result in definition of too narrow or too large relevant markets, 
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depending on the sign and size of feedback effects.161 In the presence of positive cross-platform 
network effects, a price increase on side A of the platform reduces the number of users on that 
side of the platform, which in turn reduces the number of users on side B of the platform. This 
accordingly reduces the number of users on side A of the platform and so on until a new 
equilibrium is reached. Positive network effects thus increase the substitution effect of price 
increases and reduce their profitability. Therefore, the use of the standard single-sided SSNIP 
test in the presence of positive network effects may lead to the definition of too narrow markets. 
Conversely, the use of the standard SSNIP test in the presence of negative network effects may 
lead to the definition of too wide markets. 
 
According to Belleflamme and Peitz, there are four different ways of adjusting the SSNIP test 
for price increases in a two-sided market. These options result from a platform’s need to choose 
both the price level and the price structure. The hypothetical monopolist platform could raise 
(i) the sum of prices while optimally adjusting the price structure, (ii) all prices together while 
keeping the price structure fixed, (iii) each of the prices separately allowing the other prices to 
be adjusted optimally, or (iv) each of the various prices while keeping the other prices fixed.162 
 
Filistrucchi et al. suggest that the SSNIP test should be modified in accordance with the option 
(i) or (iii), depending on whether the two-sided market is a transaction or a non-transaction 
market, respectively. In a two-sided transaction market, the profitability of an increase in the 
sum of the prices should be examined whereas in a two-sided non-transaction market the 
profitability of a rise in price on each side of the market should be checked. Ideally, in both 
cases the hypothetical monopolist should be allowed to adjust the price structure optimally.163 
If the optimal adjustment is not allowed, the loss in profits resulting from the price increase is 
overestimated, because by definition the optimal adjustment of the price structure by the 
hypothetical monopolist should reduce such a loss.164 
 
Evans and Noel would also expect a hypothetical monopolist to optimally adjust prices across 
sides and platforms in line with options (i) or (iii), just as a hypothetical monopolist would 
optimally adjust products across the firms it controls in a one-sided market.165 They propose a 
two-sided critical loss formula to be used in the CLA of platforms which operate on two 
 
161 Filistrucchi 2018, p. 46. 
162 Belleflamme and Peitz 2010, p. 640. 
163 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, pp. 332-333. 
164 Ibid, p. 332. 
165 Evans and Noel 2008, p. 674. 
 
33 
 
separate but interdependent markets. Their formula, while taking into account the multi-sided 
nature of the markets, does not however allow a hypothetical monopolist to optimally adjust 
the price structure, which, according to Filistrucchi et al., results in the definition of too wide 
markets.166 By contrast, Filistrucchi presents some two-sided CLA formulas for “media type” 
markets, which, albeit being more complex, allow the hypothetical monopolist to make the 
optimal adjustments to the price structure.167 
 
The required adjustments to the SSNIP test are more straightforward in two-sided markets 
where transactions are observable. Emch and Thompson propose that in case of payment card 
systems the adjustment can be done by applying the SSNIP test to the total price charged by the 
platform on both sides of the market when the structure of prices is set optimally via the 
interchange fee, in accordance with the option (i).168 Alexandrov et al. similarly show that in 
two-sided markets with a monopoly matchmaker the SSNIP test can be applied to the sum of 
participation fees. This is feasible, because when the matchmaker’s transaction volume is a 
function of the sum of its participation fees, it is possible to construct a demand function and 
derive elasticity of demand for transactions.169 Likewise, in case of a monopoly market maker, 
the SSNIP test can be applied to the market maker’s bid-ask spread, which reflects relative 
scarcity of buyers and sellers and competition from local dealers.170 Alexandrov et al. also show 
that, under some conditions, the demand elasticity for the matchmaker corresponds exactly to 
the demand elasticity for the market maker’s transaction volume and also to the price elasticity 
of demand in a one-sided market.171 Based on the above literature, it seems that the adjustments 
required by a two-sided SSNIP test are less complicated when defining a single two-sided 
market than when defining two separate but interdependent markets. 
 
Franck and Peitz propose in turn that option (iv) should be the default option to adjust the SSNIP 
test but they further add that it should be complemented by option (iii) if price adjustments on 
the other side of the platform are likely to arise.172 Katz and Sallet likewise prefer adjusting the 
SSNIP test first with option (iv) and examining whether there are significant feedback effects 
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and then moving on the option (iii) in the presence of strong feedback effects.173 They follow 
logic which is analogous with the standard SSNIP test: 
 
“When assessing the profitability of a SSNIP by a hypothetical monopolist that is a “standard” 
firm, it is necessary to hold the firm’s costs constant; otherwise one risks confusing a price 
increase triggered by a cost increase with one due to the exercise of market power. Similarly, in 
the presence of cross-platform network effects, users on one side of a platform can be viewed as 
inputs to the supply of services to users on the other side, and the cost of that input has to be held 
constant in applying the Hypothetical Monopolist Test.”174 
 
Whether the standard or adjusted version of the SSNIP test is used to define the relevant market 
in two-sided markets and, in the latter case, whichever option is preferred, Filistrucchi et al. 
suggest that the SSNIP test may provide useful information on the size of the relevant market 
in any case. For the aforementioned reasons related to positive network effects, a single-sided 
SSNIP test can provide evidence on the lower bound to the relevant market in a two-sided non-
transaction market.175 The standard single-sided SSNIP test can thus be a useful screen to check 
whether market power is so minor that there can be no appreciable effect on competition. In 
context of mergers, Filistrucchi et al. infer that if a merger does not raise competitive concerns 
in a narrow market defined using a single-sided SSNIP test, it will not raise them in a wider 
market defined using an adjusted two-sided SSNIP test.176 
 
Similarly, Filistrucchi et al. remark that both in two-sided transaction and non-transaction 
markets a two-sided SSNIP test that does not allow the hypothetical monopolist to optimally 
adjust the price structure can provide evidence on the upper bound of the relevant market.177 
Not allowing the hypothetical monopolist to optimally adjust the price structure overestimates 
the loss in profits, which leads to the definition of a too wide relevant market, as was remarked 
above. This upper bound can serve as another screen for market power in two-sided markets, 
much like the lower bound of the relevant market found using the single-sided SSNIP test. 
Filistrucchi et al. remark, again in the context of mergers, that if a merger does raise competitive 
concerns in a wider market defined using a two-sided SSNIP test which does not allow the 
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optimal adjustment of the price structure, it will raise them also in a narrower market defined 
using a two-sided SSNIP test which allows the optimal adjustment.178 
 
The justification for allowing a hypothetical monopolist to optimally adjust the price structure 
is stronger than preventing the hypothetical monopolist from doing so. The SSNIP test draws 
market boundaries by identifying markets which are worth monopolising. In accordance with 
the literature, any profit-maximising hypothetical monopolist in a two-sided market would 
naturally be expected, in addition to increasing the price on one side of the platform, also to 
optimally adjust the price structure to reduce the loss in participation on the other side of the 
platform. Otherwise the profits made by the hypothetical monopolist would not be optimal. 
Because of this theoretical expected behaviour, it would be against the logic of the SSNIP test 
not to allow the hypothetical monopolist to make the optimal adjustment. Therefore, options (i) 
and (iii) should be favored instead of options (ii) and (iv) when adjusting the SSNIP test in two-
sided markets, and an adjusted SSNIP test should be favored instead of the standard single-
sided SSNIP test. The presence of the cross-platform network effects must be recognised and 
their direction and strength assessed first before deciding how to adjust the SSNIP test. 
 
In practice, however, a two-sided adjusted SSNIP test seem to have been rarely, if ever, applied 
by the competition authorities.179 One reason for this might be that data requirements are higher 
in two-sided than one-sided markets.180 Even in one-sided market settings, the SSNIP test is not 
usually applied in its mathematical form because of time constraints and lack of proper data.181 
Moreover, there are often difficulties involved in quantifying the cross-platform network effects 
econometrically. Available market data does not typically contain sufficient observable 
variation in a way that would permit a proper econometric estimation of indirect network 
effects, although it is usually possible to ascertain the presence and sign of the network effects 
by using qualitative evidence.182 
 
Therefore, if market definition is required for the assessment of the competitive effects in a 
two-sided market in question and the SSNIP test in one form or the other is applicable, then, 
further adapting the suggestion of Filistrucchi et al. and assuming positive indirect network 
effects, the SSNIP test could be adjusted iteratively in an algorithmic manner below, which 
 
178 Ibid. 
179 Wismer and Rasek 2018, p. 62, and Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 339. 
180 Wismer and Rasek 2018, p. 62. 
181 Filistrucchi 2018, p. 49. 
182 Wismer and Rasek 2018, pp. 62-63. 
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approaches the correct relevant market approximately while taking into account increasing data 
requirements. 
 
As a first step, a standard one-sided SSNIP test (which has the lowest data requirements as it 
does not require any estimates of indirect network effects) could be performed to check 
whether, in a narrowest possible market, incumbent platform firms could not be reasonably 
expected to have significant market power. If there is no reason to suspect the existence of such 
market power, then further examination of the market in question is unnecessary from the 
competition law enforcement perspective. However, if there is a reason to suspect the existence 
of such market power and indirect network effects can be (roughly) estimated, then a two-sided 
SSNIP test, which does not allow adjusting the price structure optimally, could be performed 
as a second step to define the widest possible relevant market. If incumbent platform firms 
could be reasonably expected to have significant market power in these markets, it would be so 
in a narrower market as well, and there may not be a need to define the relevant market more 
precisely. However, if there is a reason to suspect that incumbent firms might have market 
power in a narrow market but not in a wider market, then a more precise market definition may 
be required and a two-sided SSNIP test, which allows the adjustment of the price structure 
optimally, could be performed as a third step if proper data and estimates of indirect network 
effects are available. Then again, the third step could be taken directly as a first step, if data and 
time are sufficiently well available and market power is suspected already in the beginning. 
 
The third problem related to market definition in two-sided markets is defining the relevant 
market in the presence of zero prices on one side of the platform. This is typical especially in 
advertising-supported media markets where platforms attract consumers on one side of the 
platform by providing them services (such as newspapers, television programs, social networks 
or search engines) free of charge while charging advertisers on the other side of the platform 
fees from advertising to consumers. Depending on the circumstances, consumers may also be 
seen as paying a non-monetary price as a form of attention they dedicate to advertisements, 
which includes an opportunity cost to consumers, or as a form of data they provide to the 
platform, which the platform uses to improve its services sold to other customers.183 
 
Firstly, it should be noted that a traditional proposition “no price, no relevant market” is false 
in the context of multi-sided platforms. As is evident from the above discussion, offering 
 
183 Franck and Peitz 2019, p. 47. 
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services free of charge for some groups of customers may well be profit-maximising for a 
platform firm. Due to indirect network effects, different customer groups are likely to affect the 
behaviour of one another, which is another reason why including non-paying customers to the 
(same or a separate) relevant market may be justified.184 Nonetheless, courts and competition 
authorities in some jurisdictions have previously been reluctant to acknowledge the existence 
of a market where customers receive goods and services without paying any remuneration.185 
In the EU, the European Commission however has long since adopted a view which recognises 
that relevant markets may exists even in absence of monetary payments. For example, in its 
decision in Microsoft/LinkedIn-merger case, the Commission acknowledged that the “vast 
majority of [social networking] services are provided free of monetary charges” but that they 
“can however be monetized through other means, such as advertising or charges for premium 
services”.186 
 
Secondly, the SSNIP test cannot be performed without problems in a market with zero prices. 
Since the SSNIP test examines the profitability of a price increase of 5 to 10 percent, there can 
be no such relative price increase when the baseline price level is zero, and therefore the test 
has no meaningful interpretation in these situations. However, when a single two-sided market 
is defined, the SSNIP can be applied the sum of prices charged to both sides of the platform 
even when one side pays a zero price. In these instances, the non-paying customers’ reaction to 
a price increase could be estimated by conducting a survey to discover their willingness to 
pay.187 
 
An alternative to the SSNIP test, originally proposed by Hartman et al.188, is the ‘SSNDQ test’ 
in which a hypothetical monopolist imposes a small but significant and non-transitory decrease 
in quality (SSNDQ) for its product instead of a SSNIP. Consumers are assumed to prefer higher 
quality products and to switch to substitute products in response to decrease in quality. Just as 
in the SSNIP test, these substitutes are then added to the relevant market until the hypothetical 
monopolist finds the decrease in quality profitable. The merit of the SSNDQ test is that it 
recognises that price is only one of the dimensions (and perhaps not even the most important 
one) on which competition takes place. This description is fitting in two-sided markets which 
 
184 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 300. 
185 For a discussion of case law in different jurisdictions pertaining to this question, see Filistrucchi et al. 2014, pp. 
316-319, and Franck and Peitz 2019, pp. 48-53. 
186 Case M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn, para 87. 
187 Filistrucchi 2018, p. 47. 
188 Hartman et al. 1993. 
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are often highly differentiated. Platforms are usually differentiated not only by their services 
but also by their number of users (platforms with more users on another side of the platform 
being perceived to be of higher quality by users on both sides in the presence of positive network 
effects). 
 
The SSNDQ test has some major weaknesses though which have reduced its application in 
practice. Firstly, there are substantial difficulties in establishing objective criteria for quality 
and measuring its competitive level, especially in highly differentiated product markets. Indeed, 
Hartman et al. themselves acknowledge that quality, unlike price, is multi-dimensional, and its 
quantification requires measuring both the change in its individual attributes and the relative 
importance of these attributes to consumers.189 Secondly, a hypothetical monopolist might not 
always have incentive to decrease the quality of its products if the product market is vertically 
differentiated (i.e. differentiated between different levels of quality). 190 In these markets, some 
of the customers are willing to pay more for the higher quality products while other customers 
would rather buy lower quality products at a lower price. A hypothetical monopolist, which 
cannot distinguish between these consumer types in advance, would not have an incentive to 
decrease the quality of its higher quality products if this placed them in increased competition 
with the lower quality products. Instead, a hypothetical monopolist would separate these 
markets, permitting partial price discrimination and higher profits.191 
 
In two-sided markets, the above weaknesses of the SSNDQ test may be lesser than in other 
markets. Since there is no price competition on the non-paying side of the market, quality may 
well be the most important dimension of competition and thus a hypothetical monopolist might 
have an incentive to decrease the quality of its services. As for the appropriate measure of 
quality, the number of users on different sides of the platform could be an obvious indicator, 
applicable to all platforms.192 As was discussed above, this is due to the fact that, in the presence 
of positive (negative) network effects, users prefer platforms with more (less) users on the other 
side of the platform and thus regard such platforms to be of higher quality. 
 
Filistrucchi therefore proposes that in some cases, where one side of the platform pays a zero 
price, a SSNDQ test may be envisaged that would examine the profitability of decreasing 
quality on the non-paying side of the platform by changing the number of users on the paying 
 
189 Ibid, p. 339. 
190 Filistrucchi 2018, p. 48, note 34. 
191 See Mussa and Rosen 1978. 
192 Filistrucchi 2018, p. 48. 
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side. In the presence of positive (negative) network effects, a decrease (increase) in the number 
of users on the paying side would amount to a decrease in quality on the non-paying side of the 
platform. For example, in case of television stations, a SSNDQ test could check the profitability 
of increasing advertising (if it is established that viewers dislike advertising). Similarly to a 
two-sided SSNIP test, a SSNDQ test in two-sided markets should consider the profitability of 
decrease in quality and feedback effects on both sides of the platform (the paying and non-
paying sides). Filistrucchi further remarks that the quality on the non-paying side of the 
platform depends also on the price charged to the paying-side of the platform and hence a 
SSNDQ test would be linked to some extent to the SSNIP test on the paying-side of the 
platform.193 
 
I conclude the discussion on market definition in antitrust analysis with some summarising 
remarks. The cellophane fallacy demonstrated how important a role market definition may play 
for the outcome of an antitrust or a merger case in certain jurisdictions. For this reason, market 
definition often becomes the focus of disputes in antitrust and merger cases in courts, receiving 
disproportionate amount of attention in the overall competitive assessment.194 However, the 
above discussion has addressed some of the specific difficulties involved in market definition 
of two-sided markets. Because of these problems, it might be advisable for competition 
authorities to place less emphasis on market definition in competitive analysis of multi-sided 
platforms where applicable.195 Competition authorities indeed often leave the question of 
market definition open where specific definition is not necessary for the analysis of competitive 
effects or its conclusions, thus avoiding the issues arising from committing into any one 
definition. 
 
In recent decades, competition authorities and courts in the EU have become increasingly aware 
of limitations of market definition and adopted a more effects-based approach to competition 
law, which signals a departure from the old, more formalistic approach in competition practice 
and case law.196 Consequently, competition authorities in the EU and elsewhere have adopted 
new instruments to address these limitations. However, these instruments have been embraced 
to complement market definition rather than to replace it.197 Market definition has thus retained 
its important place in antitrust and merger proceedings in the EU and jurisdictions worldwide. 
 
193 Ibid. 
194 Baker 2007, p. 129. 
195 OECD 2018, p. 15. 
196 OECD 2012, p. 12. See also e.g. Witt 2019. 
197 OECD 2012, p. 14. 
 
40 
 
For example, in the EU, market definition is required to calculate market shares for the 
application of block exemption regulations, which establish a ‘safe harbour’ for those 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices of firms that could otherwise be deemed 
restrictive under the EU competition rules if they did not qualify for a block exemption. 
 
Market boundaries are rarely bright lines in real markets though, especially in highly 
differentiated product markets where products are imperfect substitutes for each other. This is 
the reason why the concept ‘relevant market’ is used in competition law; its purpose is to 
separate the market under investigation from other, more commonplace conceptions of a market 
which might be unsuitable for the purposes of a competitive assessment. The relevant market 
is hence always an abstraction of reality, designed to capture the most important competitive 
constraints firms face in the market.198 Nevertheless, relying too heavily on precise market 
boundaries in subsequent competitive analysis exposes the entire analysis to possible errors 
committed in the market definition stage, which is certainly something that competitions 
authorities and courts should avoid. 
 
A good compromise to the debate about the proper use of market definition in antitrust analysis 
is offered by Evans who have proposed that competition authorities and courts should continue 
using market definition as a first step of competitive analysis but also recognise that market 
boundaries are not bright hard lines and put less analytical weight on market shares in general. 
These steps would serve to “lighten up” competitive analysis where that analysis has previously 
been overly dependent on hard market boundaries, thus avoiding any “economically 
unsupported conclusions drawn from artificial market boundaries”.199 This advice is especially 
fitting in two-sided markets where difficulties and potential problems of market definition are 
highlighted. 
 
Next, in the third chapter, I will discuss the European Union competition law and its sources, 
focusing on restrictive agreements under Article 101 of Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, before turning to discuss, in the fourth chapter, the EU case law concerning 
payment systems as two-sided platforms. I begin my discussion of the EU competition law by 
first discussing the general principles and sources of the EU law. 
  
 
198 Evans 2012, pp. 57-58. 
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3. European Union competition law 
 
 General principles and sources of EU law 
 
The European Union (EU or the ‘Union’) is a political and economic union of 27 states (the 
‘Member States’).200 Since the 1950’s, it has developed from economic cooperation between 
six Western European countries into a union of over 500 million citizens covering much of the 
European continent and focusing, in addition to economy, on diverse political issues such as 
the climate, environment, defence, security, justice and migration. The European integration 
has brought peace, stability and unprecedented economic prosperity to the peoples of Europe. 
The EU has a single currency, the euro, a single monetary policy and is the largest trade block 
and internal market (‘single market’) in the world ensuring free movement of goods, services, 
capital and labor within the EU area.201 
 
The legal system of the EU is based on the rule of law. The body of the EU law, acquis 
communautaire, consists of sources of primary law, secondary law and supplementary law.202 
Primary law includes founding and amending treaties, their annexed protocols and accession 
treaties of the Member States and some supplementary agreements such as the Treaty of 
Brussels of 1965 (Merger Treaty). Secondary law includes unilateral acts (regulations, 
directives and decisions) of the EU institutions given under the treaties and international 
conventions and agreements. Primary law and secondary law are legally binding, written 
sources of the EU law. Supplementary law, by contrast, contains unwritten sources of the EU 
law. It includes the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), international 
public law and general principles of law. Supplementary law is used by the CJEU when it 
decides cases where the primary and secondary law alone do not suffice to resolve the issue. 
Non-binding recommendations, opinions, guidelines and notices of the EU institutions may 
also have interpretative influence in application of the Union law, depending on the case.203 
 
Two main treaties (together, the ‘Treaties’), which have been amended by other treaties over 
the years (most recently by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007), are the Treaty on European 
 
200 Until recently, the EU composed of 28 Member States. However, following a 2016 referendum, in which 51,9 
percent of the British citizens voted to leave the European Union, and subsequent negotiations with the remaining 
27 EU countries and multiple delays and extensions granted by the European Council under the TEU Article 50, 
the United Kingdom became the first country to withdraw from the European Union on 31 January 2020 (‘Brexit’). 
201 The European Union 2020. 
202 For a useful summary of the EU law in the official EU law database, see EUR-Lex 2020. 
203 See e.g. Case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, EU:C:1989:646. 
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Union (‘TEU’, originally Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’, originally Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957).204 
The Treaty of Lisbon also made the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the 
‘Charter’) a legally binding document and it now has the same legal status as the other EU 
treaties.205 In addition to these treaties, there remains in force the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Euratom’), a separate international organisation 
which is governed by the EU institutions.206 
 
The Treaties establish the different EU institutions and their powers. The most important 
institutions of the Union, as defined in the Treaty on European Union, are the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council (of the EU), the European Commission (the 
‘Commission’), the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’), the European Central 
Bank and the Court of Auditors.207 
 
The European Council defines the general political directions and priorities for the development 
of the Union.208 It consists of the heads of state or government of the Member States, together 
with its president and the president of the Commission. 
 
The European Parliament and the Council jointly exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions.209 Together, they form the legislative branch of the EU. The European Parliament 
consists of directly elected representatives of the Union’s citizens, elected for a term of five 
years, whereas the Council consists of representatives of Member States at ministerial level, of 
different configurations. In competition matters, the Council lays down regulations and 
directives to give effect to the principles of the competition provisions of the Treaties, on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.210 
 
204 Article 1(3) TEU. The most recent consolidated versions of the TEU and TFEU were published in OJ 2016/C 
202/1. 
205 Article 6(1) TEU. The most recent consolidated version of the Charter was published in OJ 2016/C 202/2. 
206 The most recent consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community was 
published in OJ 2016/C 203/1. Euratom is one of the three original international organisations previously forming 
the European Communities, brought under the same governing institutions in 1967 by the Merger Treaty, the other 
two organisations being the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which was renamed as the European Community (EC) in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht. The ECSC 
expired in 2002 and the EC ceased to exist in 2009 as its absorption into the European Union was completed by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, which made the EU its own legal entity. For more history on the integration of the EU, see 
e.g. Dinan 2014. 
207 Article 13 TEU. 
208 Article 15 TEU 
209 Article 14 and 16 TEU. 
210 Article 103 TFEU. 
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The Commission is the executive branch of the EU. It promotes the general interest of the 
Union, ensures the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions 
pursuant to them.211 The Commission oversees the application of Union law under the control 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, makes proposals for legislative acts and executes 
the budget and manages programmes. The Commission also has other coordinating, executive 
and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties. The Commission ensures the 
application of the principles of the competition provisions of the Treaties and investigates cases 
of suspected infringement of these principles, in cooperation with the competent authorities in 
the Member States.212 Directorate-General of Competition (DG COMP) is the Commission 
department responsible for the EU competition policy and enforcement of the Union 
competition rules. 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is the judicial branch of the Union. It ensures that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.213 It includes the Court 
of Justice, the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) and specialised courts. The 
CJEU rules on actions brought by a Member State, an institution or a natural or legal person, 
gives preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member States, on the 
interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions, and rules in other 
cases provided for in the Treaties. In competition matters, the General Court has the jurisdiction 
to hear and determine at first instance the legality of regulations and decisions of the 
Commission.214 Decisions given by the General Court may be subject to a right of appeal to the 
Court of Justice on points of law only.215 
 
The European Central Bank issues the euro and, together with the national central banks of the 
Member States whose currency is the euro, conducts the monetary policy of the Union.216 The 
primary objective of the European Central Bank and the national central banks, constituting the 
European System of Central Banks, is to maintain price stability. The Court of Auditors carries 
out the Union’s audit.217 
 
 
211 Article 17 TEU. 
212 Article 105 TFEU. 
213 Article 19 TEU. 
214 Article 256(1) TFEU and Article 263(1) TFEU. 
215 Article 256(1) TFEU. 
216 Article 282 TFEU. 
217 Article 285 TFEU. 
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The Treaties determine the distribution of competences between the Union and the Member 
States. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.218 Under 
the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the treaties to attain their objectives. Competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.219 
 
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.220 The principle of subsidiarity determines when it is appropriate for the EU to 
act instead of the Member States when the EU does not have exclusive competence. The 
principle of proportionality, in turn, determines the extent of the Union action. Under the 
principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union 
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.221 Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.222 
 
The EU may have exclusionary competence, shared competence or supporting competence. 
The difference between the exclusionary and shared competence is that when the treaties confer 
on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered 
by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.223 By contrast, when the Treaties confer 
on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the 
Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. 
The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
decided to cease exercising its competence.224 EU competition law belongs to the area of 
exclusive and shared competence. The Union has exclusive competence in the establishing of 
 
218 Article 5(1) TEU. 
219 Article 5(2) TEU. 
220 Article 5(1) TEU. 
221 Article 5(3) TEU. 
222 Article 5(4) TEU. 
223 Article 2(1) TFEU. 
224 Article 2(2) TFEU. 
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the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.225 The internal market 
in general is among the areas where the EU has shared competence.226 
 
In areas of supporting competence and under the conditions laid down in the treaties, the Union 
shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of 
the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.227 The EU has 
also some special competences in the area of the common foreign and security policy228 and 
coordination of economic, social and employment policies of the Member States229. 
 
There are general principles in the EU law which are not included in the Treaties but rather 
created in application of those Treaties by the CJEU, which has occasionally taken a very 
prominent role in the development of the Union law. One such fundamental principle is the 
‘direct effect’ of the EU law, which was established by the Court of Justice in Van Gend en 
Loos in 1963.230 In accordance with that principle, the Union law does not oblige only Member 
States but may produce direct effects and confer individual rights which national courts must 
protect. This principle is in stark contrast to the principles of international law, under which 
obligations are primarily applicable only to the states, and thus signifies the special status of 
the Union law in comparison with the international law. The direct effect of a Union provision 
depends on the type of the Union act and is subject to several conditions, including that the 
provision in question is clear, unconditional and not a positive but a negative obligation.231 In 
addition to principle of direct effect, the Court of Justice has also established the principle of 
indirect effect, under which the national courts are required to interpret national laws, as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the provisions of the EU law.232 
 
Another fundamental general principle is the ‘primacy’ (or ‘supremacy’) of the EU law, which 
provides that, if a national law contradicts the Union Law, the Union law takes precedence. 
This cornerstone principle of the EU law was established by the Court of Justice in 1964 in 
 
225 Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
226 Article 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
227 Article 2(5) TFEU. 
228 Article 2(4) TFEU. 
229 Article 5 TFEU. 
230 Case 26/62 N.V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
administratie der belastingen, EU:C:1963:1. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, EU:C:1990:395. 
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Costa v ENEL. 233 The Court of Justice based the principle on the “special and original nature” 
of the Community treaty without a direct reference to its provisions: 
 
“It follows [...] that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of 
the Community itself being called into question.”234 
 
The principle of primacy, as the principle of direct effect, is not included in the Treaties. 
However, the Treaty of Lisbon did attach a declaration to the Treaties acknowledging the 
existence of the principle of primacy.235 The following case law of the CJEU has further 
established that a national court has a duty to give full effect to the provisions of the Union law 
and, if necessary, to refuse to apply any conflicting national laws, even if adopted 
subsequently.236 
 
The courts of the Member States, which the EU relies on for the enforcement of its law, have 
accepted these principles in their practice in accordance with the principle of sincere 
cooperation, pursuant to which the Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general 
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union.237 
 
 Overview of EU competition law and Article 101 TFEU 
 
The Treaties include the Union policies and their goals. Among these are the policies 
concerning the internal market and competition. The overarching purpose of the single market 
is contained in Article 3(3) TEU, which provides that the Union shall establish an internal 
market and work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
 
233 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, EU:C:1964:66. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, 
signed on 13 December 2007, 17. Declaration concerning primacy, published in OJ 2016/C 202/01. The principle 
of primacy was included in the Article I-6 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional 
Treaty, published in OJ 2004/C 310/1), which was, however, not ratified due to its rejection by voters in 
referendums in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. 
236 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, EU:C:1978:49. 
237 Article 4(3) TEU. 
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employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment. It shall also promote scientific and technological advance. 
 
The role of the competition policy as an instrument of the internal market is verified in Protocol 
27, annexed to the Treaties, under which the internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU includes 
a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and the Union shall, if necessary, take action 
under the provisions of the Treaties to this end. The Protocol has the same legal force as the 
provisions of the Treaties in accordance with the Article 51 TEU.238 Together, Article 3(3) TEU 
and Protocol 27 have had significant effect in application of the competition law by the 
European Commission and the CJEU.239 This “single market imperative” is a unique feature of 
the EU competition law as has been remarked by Whish and Bailey: 
 
“EU competition law has been (and will continue to be) strongly influenced by single market 
integration; this has meant that decisions have sometimes been taken prohibiting behaviour which 
a competition authority elsewhere, unconcerned with single market considerations, would not 
have reached. Faced with a conflict between the narrow interests of a particular firm and the wider 
aim of integrating national markets, the tendency has been to subordinate the former to the 
latter.”240 
 
The principle of an open market economy with free competition is also the foundation for 
economic policies of the Union and Member States. It is mentioned in Article 119(1) TFEU 
which provides that for the purposes set out in Article 3 TEU, the activities of the Member 
States and the Union shall include the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the 
close coordination of Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the 
definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition. 
 
The most important provisions of the Treaties concerning the Union competition law are 
contained in Chapter 1 of Title VII of Part Three of the TFEU. The main provisions are Article 
101 TFEU concerning restrictive agreements, Article 102 TFEU concerning abuse of dominant 
position, Article 106 TFEU concerning public undertakings and special and exclusive rights 
and Articles 107-109 TFEU concerning the prohibited state aid. In addition to these provisions, 
important legislative acts in the EU competition law include the EU Merger Regulation 
 
238 Article 51 TEU: “The Protocols and Annexes to the Treaties shall form an integral part thereof.” 
239 Whish and Bailey 2018, p. 52. 
240 Ibid, p. 24. 
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139/2004241 (the ‘EUMR’) concerning merger control and Regulation 1/2003242, which 
provides the Commission and national competition authorities (the ‘NCAs’) and national courts 
powers to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The following discussion will focus on Article 
101 in more detail. 
 
Article 101(1) prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market. Particularly prohibited are agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share 
markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the 
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. Under Article 102(2), any such agreements or decisions prohibited shall be 
automatically void. 
 
The ‘effect on trade between the Member states’ is an important concept in many regards. It is 
a prerequisite for the applicability of the Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and it also determines the 
jurisdiction of the NCAs and national courts in the enforcement of those rules.243 The CJEU 
has clarified the concept numerous times in its case law which the Commission has cited in its 
Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (the 
‘Guidelines on inter-state trade’)244. Firstly, for the application of Article 101, it is enough that 
the agreement or practice as a whole is capable of affecting trade.245 It is not required that each 
individual clause in an agreement should be capable of affecting inter-state trade.246 Similarly, 
 
241 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), published in OJ 2004/L 24/1. 
242 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, published in OJ 2003/L 1/1. 
243 Under Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003, where the competition authorities of the Member States or national 
courts apply national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States, they shall also apply Article 101 TFEU to such 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Similarly, where the competition authorities of the Member States 
or national courts apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, they shall also 
apply Article 102 TFEU. 
244 Commission Notice — Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 
published in OJ 2004/C 101/07. 
245 Ibid, para 14. 
246 Case 193/83 Windsurfing, EU:C:1986:75, para 96. 
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in the application of Article 102 and the case of abuse of a dominant position, the behaviour of 
the dominant undertaking must be assessed in terms of its overall impact.247 Secondly, the 
concept of “trade” is not limited to traditional exchanges of goods and services across borders 
but is a wider concept, covering all cross-border economic activity including establishment.248 
The concept covers also cases where agreements or practices affect the competitive structure of 
the market.249 
 
Thirdly, the notion ‘may affect’ reflects the fact that the effect on trade criterion is a 
jurisdictional one, serving to distinguish those agreements and practices which warrant an 
examination under the Union competition rules and those which do not.250 It is not required to 
establish that agreements have in fact appreciably affected trade but merely that such 
agreements are capable of having that effect.251 It must be, however, possible to foresee with a 
sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that 
the agreement may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of 
trade between Member States.252 Merely hypothetical or speculative effects are not sufficient 
for establishing Union law jurisdiction.253 Fourthly, the effect on trade must be ‘appreciable’, 
that is, of a certain magnitude.254 Appreciability may be appraised in particular by reference to 
the position and the importance of the parties on the market for the products concerned.255 
Consequently, an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 101 when it has only an 
insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons 
concerned have on the market of the product in question.256 It should be noted that the concept 
of appreciable effect on inter-state trade is distinct from appreciable restriction of competition 
which is another prerequisite for the application of Article 101. 
 
There is an important difference between the agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition and the 
 
247 Guidelines on inter-state trade, para 17. 
248 Ibid, para 19. See also the referred case law Case 172/80 Züchner, EU:C:1981:178, para 18; Case C-309/99 
Wouters, EU:C:2002:98, para 95; Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner, EU:C:2001:577, para 49; Joined cases C-
215/96 and C-216/96 Bagnasco, EU:C:1999:12, para 51; Case C-55/96 Job Centre, EU:C:1997:603, para 37; and 
Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser, EU:C:1991:161, para 33. 
249 Guidelines on inter-state trade, para 20. See also Joined cases 6 and 7-73 Commercial Solvents v Commission, 
EU:C:1974:18, para 33. 
250 Guidelines on inter-state trade, para 35. 
251 Case 19/77 Miller, EU:C:1978:19, para 15, and Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar, EU:T:1999:246, para 170. 
252 Case 5-69 Völk v Vervaecke, EU:C:1969:35, para 5. 
253 Guidelines on inter-state trade, para 43. 
254 Case 22-71 Béguelin, EU:C:1971:113, para 16. 
255 Case C-306/96 Javico, EU:C:1998:173, para 17. 
256 Case 5-69 Völk v Vervaecke, EU:C:1969:35, para 7. 
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agreements, decisions and concerted practices which have as their effect of doing so. The reason 
for this distinction, as the Court of Justice has interpret it in Cartes Bancaires257, is that certain 
types of coordination between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being 
harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.258 Consequently, it is established that 
certain collusive behaviour may be considered so likely to have negative effects that it may be 
considered redundant, for the purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, to prove that they 
have actual effects on the market.259 The essential legal criterion for ascertaining whether 
coordination between undertakings involves such a restriction of competition ‘by object’ is the 
finding that such coordination reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition.260 
 
In the absence of a restriction of competition ‘by object’, agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices may be prohibited under Article 101(1) if they restrict competition ‘by effect’. In 
accordance with the settled case law of the CJEU, in order to determine whether an agreement 
is to be considered to be prohibited by reason of the distortion of competition which is its effect, 
the competition in question should be assessed within the actual context in which it would occur 
in the absence of the agreement in dispute.261 Such an assessment is not restricted to actual 
effects alone but it must also take account of the agreement’s potential effects on competition 
within the internal market.262 This means that a full analysis of the agreement in its market 
context must be conducted before it is possible to assess whether the effect of the agreement is 
to restrict competition.263 
 
The object-effect distinction of Article 101(1) loosely resembles the ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’ 
distinction in the US antitrust law, although the US and EU antitrust laws are materially 
different from each other. Under the Sherman Act in the US, some agreements, such as 
horizontal price-fixing agreements, are considered illegal per se, by itself, whereas in other 
cases conduct’s anticompetitiveness must be judged under the rule of reason standard, first 
established by the US Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v United States264 in 1911. In the rule 
of reason doctrine, the pro- and anticompetitive effects of a disputed conduct are weighed to 
 
257 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204. 
258 Ibid, para 50. 
259 Ibid, para 51. 
260 Ibid, para 57. 
261 Case C-7/95 P John Deere v Commission, EU:C:1998:256, para 76. See also the referred case law Case 56/65 
Société Technique Minière, EU:C:1966:38, and Case 31/80 L’Oréal v De Nieuwe AMCK, EU:C:1980:289, para 
19. 
262 Ibid, para 77. 
263 Whish and Bailey 2018, p. 134. 
264 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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assess whether the conduct unreasonably restricts trade and thus should be prohibited. This is 
done by using a three-step, burden-shifting framework. The plaintiff must first prove that the 
challenged conduct has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant 
market. If the plaintiff shows this, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
procompetitive effects of the conduct. If the defendant demonstrates this, then the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff to show that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved 
through less anticompetitive means.265 However, the rule of reason doctrine does not exist in 
the EU law, as the CJEU has stated in its case law266, largely because the EU competition law 
includes in its place Article 101(3) TFEU, for which there is no equivalent provision in the US 
antitrust law.267 The Commission has noted that: 
 
“If more systematic use were made under Article [101(1)] of an analysis of the pro- and anti-
competitive aspects of a restrictive agreement, Article [101(3)] would be cast aside, whereas any 
such change could be made only through revision of the Treaty. It would at the very least be 
paradoxical to cast aside Article [101(3)] when that provision in fact contains all the elements of 
a ‘rule of reason’.”268 
 
Article 101(3) establishes a legal exception to the prohibition of Article 101(1). It provides that 
Article 101(1) may be declared inapplicable in the case of any agreement between undertakings, 
decision by associations of undertakings or concerted practice, or categories of these, which 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. These conditions are 
cumulative and all four of them must be satisfied for an agreement to be exempted under Article 
101(3).269 
 
265 Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. ____, 9-10 (2018). 
266 See e.g. Case C‑235/92 P Montecatini v Commission, EU:C:1999:362, para 133; Case T-112/99 Métropole 
télévision (M6) v Commission, EU:T:2001:215, paras 72 and 74; Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v 
Commission, EU:T:2003:281, paras 106-107; and Case T-328/03 O2 (Germany) v Commission, EU:T:2006:116, 
para 69. 
267 Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6) v Commission, EU:T:2001:215, para 74: “Article [101(3) TFEU] 
would lose much of its effectiveness if such an examination had to be carried out already under Article [101(1) 
TFEU].” 
268 White paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, published in OJ 
1999/C 132/1, para 57. 
269 See Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission, EU:C:1984:9, para 61; Case 42/84 Remia 
and others v Commission, EU:C:1985:327, para 38; and Case C‑68/12 Slovenská sporiteľňa, EU:C:2013:71, para 
36. 
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Before 2004, under Article 9(1) of the Regulation 17 of 1962270, the Commission, subject to 
review of its decision by the Court of Justice, had sole power to declare Article 101(1) TFEU 
inapplicable. This resulted in a burdensome notification system which prevented the 
Commission from concentrating its resources on curbing the most serious infringements and 
imposed considerable costs on undertakings.271 Following the Regulation 1/2003, which 
modernised the public enforcement of the EU competition rules, the Commission no longer has 
a monopoly over defining which agreements, decisions and concerted practices qualify for the 
exception of Article 101(3) and authority to grant these individual exemptions. Undertakings 
themselves are now responsible to ensure that their agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices comply with the EU competition rules. The undertaking or association of undertakings 
claiming the benefit of Article 101(3) bears the burden of proving that the conditions of that 
provision are fulfilled.272 
 
It is noteworthy that any agreement can be exempted under Article 101(3), including, in 
principle, agreements which restrict competition ‘by object’.273 This is another difference with 
the US antitrust law where the unlawfulness of agreements, which are found to be illegal per 
se, cannot be rebutted thereafter based on their procompetitive effects. However, the 
Commission has been very reluctant to apply Article 101(3) in individual cases after the 
adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and abolition of the old notification system. This has contributed 
to a widely held belief that it is difficult for an agreement to satisfy the four conditions of Article 
101(3), and perhaps impossible in the case of an object restriction.274 
 
Instead of satisfying the conditions of Article 101(3) individually, a restrictive agreement may 
also be considered lawful under Article 101(3) if it qualifies for a block exemption issued for a 
category of agreements, decisions or concerted practices by the Council or the Commission, 
acting under the authority conferred to it by the Council in accordance with the Article 
103(2)(b) TFEU. The Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article [101(3) TFEU] 
 
270 EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, published in 
OJ 1962 13/204. 
271 Recital 3 of Regulation 1/2003. 
272 Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003. 
273 See Case T-460/13 Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission, EU:T:2016:453, para 228; Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre 
Dermo-Cosmétique, EU:C:2011:649, para 59; and Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v Commission, EU:T:1994:89, 
para 85. 
274 Whish and Bailey 2018, p. 176. 
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(the ‘Article 101(3) Guidelines’)275 provides that when an agreement is covered by a block 
exemption the parties to the restrictive agreement are relieved of their burden under Article 2 
of Regulation 1/2003 of showing that their individual agreement satisfies each of the conditions 
of Article 101(3). The parties only have to show that the restrictive agreement benefits from a 
block exemption. The application of Article 101(3) to categories of agreements by way of block 
exemption regulation is based on the presumption that restrictive agreements that fall within 
their scope fulfil each of the four conditions laid down in Article 101(3).276 This means that if 
an agreement is within the block exemption it is then in practice redundant to assess whether it 
infringes Article 101(1).277 
 
The Commission has granted many categories of agreements a ‘safe harbour’ in form of a block 
exemption, each of which has an expiry date. Important block exemptions include, among 
others, Regulation 330/2010278 on vertical agreements and Regulation 316/2014279 on 
technology transfer agreements, issued under the Council Regulation 19/65280, as amended by 
Regulation 1215/1999281, and Regulation 1217/2010282 on research and development 
agreements and Regulation 1218/2010283 on specialisation agreements, issued under the 
Council Regulation 2821/71284. 
 
A restrictive agreement may also be exempted from Article 101(1) under the de minimis 
doctrine developed by the Court of Justice in Völk v Vervaecke285. Under this doctrine, 
 
275 Communication from the Commission — Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
published in OJ 2004/C 101/08. 
276 Ibid, para 35. 
277 Case C-260/07 Pedro IV Servicios SL v Total España SA, EU:C:2009:215, para 36. 
278 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, published 
in OJ 2010/L 102/1. 
279 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of technology transfer agreements, published in OJ 2014/L 
93/17. 
280 Regulation No 19/65/EEC of 2 March of the Council on application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted practices, published in OJ 1965 36/533. 
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148/1. 
282 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements, 
published in OJ 2010/L 335/36. 
283 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements, published in 
OJ 2010/L 335/43. 
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agreements which have only an insignificant effect on the market do not constitute an 
appreciable restriction of competition and thus fall outside of scope of Article 101(1).286 The 
Court of Justice has refined the doctrine in Expedia287 by excluding from its scope agreements 
that are restrictive ‘by object’. Such agreements constitute, by their nature and independently 
of any concrete effect that they may have, an appreciable restriction on competition.288 The 
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance289 provides guidance on appreciability 
and a safe harbour from application of Article 101(1) for agreements which do not exceed 
certain market thresholds. These thresholds are 10 percent aggregate market share held by the 
parties (for agreements between competitors) and 15 percent market share held by each of the 
parties (for agreements between non-competitors) on any of the relevant markets.290 
 
As for market definition, it may be necessary to define the relevant market under Article 101 
TFEU when examining whether an agreement or practice has an appreciable effect on trade291 
or an appreciable effect on restricting competition292 and under different block exemptions 
when these contain market thresholds. Market definition plays an important role in the 
application of other EU competition rules as well. It is the first step in the assessment of 
dominance under Article 102 in which the definition of the relevant market is “of essential 
significance” for the appraisal of dominant position.293 Likewise, a proper definition of the 
relevant market is a necessary precondition for the assessment of the effects of the concentration 
on competition in merger cases under EUMR.294 The definition of the relevant market serves a 
different purpose according to whether Article 101 or Article 102 is to be applied, however.295 
This follows from the fact that, for the purposes of Article 102, establishing the existence of a 
dominant position in a given market presupposes that such a market has already been defined, 
whereas, for the purposes of applying Article 101, the reason for defining the relevant market 
 
286 It should be remembered from the foregoing discussion that for the application of the Union law it is necessary 
that there exists both an appreciable restriction on competition and an appreciable effect on trade between the 
Member States. 
287 Case C‑226/11 Expedia, EU:C:2012:795. 
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is to determine whether the agreement or practice at issue is liable to affect trade between 
Member States and has as its object or effect restriction of competition.296 As a general rule, 
there is an obligation on the Commission to define the relevant market in applying Article 101 
where it is impossible, without such a definition, to determine whether the agreement or practice 
is liable to affect trade between Member States and has as its object or effect restriction of 
competition.297 
 
The Commission has published Notice on Market Definition which provides guidance on its 
market definition practice and which has been cited by the CJEU many times in its case law.298 
Although the Commission cannot depart from rules which it has imposed on itself299, the 
Commission retains, where the terms of its notices allow so, great freedom of action to choose 
those types of evidence or approaches which are the most appropriate in the circumstances of a 
given case300. The CJEU has recognised that the Commission has a ‘margin of assessment’ in 
economic or technical matters that are complex, such as market definition, which allows the 
Commission flexibility in its administrative practice. The CJEU, however, must establish 
whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate and capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it.301 
 
Notice on Market Definition determines that the relevant market is established by the 
combination of the product and geographic markets.302 A relevant product market comprises 
all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use.303 The 
relevant geographic market, in turn, comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned 
are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring 
areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those area.304 
 
 
296 Case T-29/92 SPO and Others v Commission, EU:T:1995:34, para 74. 
297 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission, EU:T:2000:180, para 230. See also the referred case law Joined cases 
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298 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission, EU:T:2010:266, paras 86-87, and Case T-427/08 Confédération 
européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v Commission, EU:T:2010:517, paras 68-70. 
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300 Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission, EU:T:2005:456, para 519. 
301 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission, EU:T:2010:266, paras 32-33, and Case T-201/04 Microsoft 
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Pursuant to Notice on Market Definition, the main purpose of market definition is to identify in 
a systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face.305 Those 
constraints may be derived from three main sources: demand substitutability, supply 
substitutability and potential competition.306 The assessment of demand substitution entails a 
determination of the range of products which are viewed as substitutes by the consumer.307 The 
hypothetical monopolist test (SSNIP test) is employed to achieve this. Specifically, the question 
to be answered is whether the customers would switch to readily available substitutes or to 
suppliers located elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small (in the range 5 to 10 percent) 
but permanent relative price increase in the products and areas being considered. If substitution 
were enough to make the price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, 
additional substitutes and areas are included in the relevant market.308 
 
Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when suppliers, in response to small 
and permanent changes in relative prices, are able to switch production to the relevant products 
and market them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks. This 
additional production that is put on the market will have a disciplinary effect on the competitive 
behaviour of the companies involved.309 In other cases and more typically, however, supply 
substitutability is considered only at the later stage of competition analysis when assessing 
market power of the companies involved. The same applies for potential competition which is 
not taken into account when defining markets but at a subsequent stage, in general once the 
position of the companies involved in the relevant market has already been ascertained.310 
 
Next, in the fourth chapter, I will discuss the CJEU case law and Commission decision-making 
practice concerning payment systems as two-sided platforms and the implications of the Court 
of Justice’s judgments for the EU competition law. 
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4. Multi-sided platforms in the EU case law: payment card systems 
 
While cases involving multi-sided platforms that have dealt specifically with two-sided markets 
have been few in the CJEU case law, the Commission has had a chance to address two-sided 
markets in several cases that have involved mainly payment systems and digital platforms311. 
For instance, in Facebook/WhatsApp312 merger case the Commission approved the acquisition 
of WhatsApp by Facebook on grounds that the parties were not close competitors in the market 
of consumer communications apps, which was a very dynamic and fast-growing market 
characterised by frequent market entry and short innovation cycles.313 This conclusion was 
based, inter alia, on the Commission’s finding that WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger were 
used simultaneously by the majority of users in the EEA and that this multi-homing made them 
complementary.314 The Commission also determined that despite network effects barriers to 
entry in the market were low, which made any market position unlikely to be incontestable.315 
In Google Android316 antitrust case the Commission in turn fined Google a record of 4.34 billion 
euros for imposing illegal restrictions on Android device manufacturers and mobile network 
operators. Following a market definition exercise in two-sided markets which involved the use 
of a SSNDQ test, the Commission found that Google had abused its dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 102 TFEU in the national markets of general internet search services 
and in the worldwide markets (excluding China) of licensable smart mobile operating systems 
and Android app stores. 
 
Although the Commission has not yet clarified its administrative practice on market definition 
or competitive assessment of multi-sided platforms by way of guidelines or notices regarding, 
for instance, the question of when to follow the single-market approach or the multiple-market 
approach in market definition317, the past cases have developed the Commission’s approach to 
competitive assessment of platforms and provided the context in which the CJEU has addressed 
the implications of two-sided markets for the EU case law. 
 
 
311 See e.g. Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Case AT.40099 Google Android, Case M.4731 
Google/DoubleClick, Case M.5727 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, Case M.6281 Microsoft/Skype, Case 
M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, Case M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn and Case M.8180 Verizon/Yahoo. For a very brief 
summary of these cases, see Franck and Peitz 2019, pp. 20-21. 
312 Case M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp. 
313 Ibid, para 99. 
314 Ibid, para 105. 
315 Ibid, para 132. 
316 Case AT.40099 Google Android, under appeal (Case T-604/18 Google and Alphabet v Commission, not yet 
decided). 
317 See Franck and Peitz 2019, p. 30. 
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Thus far, the Court of Justice have dealt with two-sided markets and their implications for 
competitive analysis on two occasions that involved payment systems. On 11 September 2014, 
the Court of Justice gave judgments in landmark cases Cartes Bancaires318 and MasterCard319 
which clarified the established case law on restrictions of competition under Article 101 TFEU 
and established new rules applicable to two-sided markets. Unlike the General Court, which 
reviewed the Commission’s market definition practice in these cases, the Court of Justice did 
not discuss market definition directly in either case. However, the Court of Justice recognised 
the two-sided nature of the payment systems and emphasised that effects of restrictions beyond 
the relevant market cannot be ignored in the analysis of restrictions of competition concerning 
two-sided platforms. These cases and their implications for the EU competition law will be 
discussed in detail below. 
 
Cartes Bancaires concerned the Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB), a group of main 
French banking institutions, which manages a system for bank card payments and withdrawals 
between its members in France, In cooperation with Visa and MasterCard, the CB system 
enables payments from cardholders to merchants affiliated with the CB group and withdrawals 
from automatic teller machines (ATMs) operated by CB members (acquiring side) using bank 
cards issued by CB members (issuing side). In the early 2000s, CB planned to adopt new pricing 
measures, which included fees for issuing cards and joining the group, and notified these to the 
Commission under Regulation 17 of 1962. According to CB, the fees were aimed to encourage 
its members to expand their acquiring activities and to prevent free-riding on investments made 
by those members whose acquiring activities were considerable in relation to their issuing 
activities.320 
 
After investigating the measures, the Commission adopted a series of statement of objections 
and a subsequent decision321 in which it found that the scheme had the object and effect of 
restricting competition by hindering competition from new entrants and limiting the issuing of 
cards and that it therefore infringed Article 101 TFEU. The Commission recognised that, as in 
other card payment systems, four parties were involved in the processing of payment 
transactions in the CB system: card-issuing financial institutions (‘issuers’), merchant-
acquiring (or ATM-managing) financial institutions (‘acquirers’), cardholders and merchants 
equipped with payment terminals. It made a distinction between payment card issuance, 
 
318 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204. 
319 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201. 
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acquiring of payment and withdrawal transactions, and competition between systems and 
examined each of these separately. Based on these considerations, the Commission defined the 
relevant market in the case to be the issuance of payments cards in France.322 The Commission 
thus followed the approach it had adopted in its Visa International - Multilateral Interchange 
Fee decision in which it considered the card payment systems market (“system/network 
market”) to be separate from issuance and acquiring markets (“intrasystem markets”).323 This 
approach to market definition of payment systems is a mixture of the single-market approach 
and the multiple-markets approach in a sense that a single market is defined for card payment 
transactions while separate markets are defined for card-related services offered to each side of 
a two-sided platform. 
 
However, unlike in the Visa International - Multilateral Interchange Fee decision in which the 
Commission had recognised that the competition in the payment systems market is determined 
by inter-related decisions of consumers and merchants324, in Cartes Bancaires the Commission 
deviated from its earlier practice and defined that payment systems competed with one another 
to induce financial institutions (not consumers and merchants) to join their network instead of 
joining another payment system network.325 By focusing only on the adoption of the payment 
card system by banks with regard to payment system market, the Commission disregarded the 
importance of card usage by consumers and merchants for competition between these 
systems.326 
 
CB appealed to the General Court, which dismissed the appeal in its entirety.327 The General 
Court agreed with the Commission that the pricing measures restricted competition ‘by object’ 
and therefore there was no need to examine further the appellant’s arguments on whether the 
pricing measures had the effect of restricting competition. On appeal, the Court of Justice 
however set aside the judgment of the General Court and referred the case back to it.328 The 
Court of Justice concluded that the General Court had erred in law in holding that the pricing 
measures had as their object a restriction of competition and that it had failed to observe the 
standard of judicial review required under the case law.329 Following a referral from the Court 
 
322 Ibid, paras 163-164 and 189. 
323 Case COMP/29.373 Visa International - Multilateral Interchange Fee, recital 43. 
324 Ibid, para 46. 
325 Case COMP/D1/38.606 Groupement des cartes bancaires “CB”, para 167. 
326 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 312. 
327 Case T-491/07 Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:T:2012:633. For an English summary, see 
Stone 2013. 
328 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204. 
329 Ibid, para 92. 
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of Justice, the General Court eventually upheld the Commission decision for a second time, 
finding that the pricing measures restricted competition ‘by effect’ within the meaning of 
Article 101 TFEU.330 
 
In Cartes Bancaires the Court of Justice made important remarks on various points of the EU 
competition law. Firstly, the Court of Justice expressly acknowledged for the first time that 
concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ must be interpreted restrictively.331 It affirmed 
that the concept can be applied “only to certain types of coordination between undertakings 
which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found that there is no 
need to examine their effects”.332 This clarified established case law and put an end to the steady 
expansion of the ‘object box’ in the Commission decision-making practice, especially 
following judgments in cases T-Mobile333 and Allianz Hungária334 where the Court of Justice 
had adopted a much broader view of object restrictions.335 
 
Secondly, the Court of Justice made also an important remark on the standard of judicial review 
required from the General Court under the union case law. The Court of Justice remarked that 
although the Commission has a ‘margin of assessment’ with regard to economic matters, in 
particular in the context of complex economic assessments, that does not mean that the General 
Court must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s “legal classification of information of an 
economic nature”.336 The Court of Justice further elaborated that the General Court must not 
substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission but it must establish whether 
the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent and whether that evidence 
contains all the relevant information which must be taken into account in order to assess a 
complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.337 
The Court of Justice noted that the General Court had failed to review whether the evidence 
used by the Commission enabled it correctly to conclude that the pricing measures displayed a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition to be regarded as having as their object a restriction of 
competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.338 These statements marked the first 
 
330 Case T-491/07 RENV Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:T:2016:379. For an English 
summary, see Canapa 2016. 
331 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 142. 
332 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, para 58. 
333 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile, EU:C:2009:343. 
334 Case C‑32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt, EU:C:2013:160. 
335 See Whish and Bailey 2018, pp. 123-125. 
336 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, para 46. 
337 Ibid. See also Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission, EU:C:2011:815, para 54. 
338 Ibid, para 90. 
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time that the Court of Justice distinguished so clearly the General Court’s required level of the 
judicial review from the Commission’s ‘margin of assessment’.339 
 
Thirdly, and most importantly with respect to two-sided markets, the Court of Justice concluded 
that two-sidedness of a system must be taken into account in the analysis of object restrictions, 
regardless of the specific definition of the relevant market. The General Court had held that, 
since the relevant market was the issue of payment cards in France, the balancing between the 
issuing and acquisition activities within the CB system did not have to be examined in the 
context of Article 101(1) TFEU.340 The Court of Justice rejected this view, stating that the 
General Court had confused the definition of the relevant market and the context which must 
be taken into account in order to ascertain whether the content of an agreement or a decision by 
an association of undertakings reveals the existence of a restriction of competition ‘by object’ 
within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.341 The Court of Justice clarified the need for 
contextual analysis in cases that concern two-sided systems in a following manner: 
 
 “In order to assess whether coordination between undertakings is by nature harmful to the proper 
functioning of normal competition, it is necessary […] to take into consideration all relevant 
aspects – having regard, in particular, to the nature of the services at issue, as well as the real 
conditions of the functioning and structure of the markets – of the economic or legal context in 
which that coordination takes place, it being immaterial whether or not such an aspect relates to 
the relevant market. […] That must be the case, in particular, when that aspect is the taking into 
account of interactions between the relevant market and a different related market […] and, all 
the more so, when, as in the present case, there are interactions between the two facets of a two-
sided system.”342 
 
Cartes Bancaires, in the above paragraphs of the judgment, established the principle that the 
interaction between the two sides of a two-sided market must be taken into account in the 
assessment of object restrictions under Article 101 TFEU irrespective of how the relevant 
market is defined or whether a restriction concerns only one side of the market.343 The Court of 
Justice decided to do this by reiterating settled case law regarding object restrictions on one-
sided markets and extending contextual analysis from these to concern all sides of two-sided 
 
339 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 149. 
340 Case T-491/07 Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:T:2012:633, para 105. 
341 Case C‑67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, paras 76-77. 
342 Ibid, paras 78-79. Emphasis added. 
343 Nazzini and Nikpay 2014, p. 167. 
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markets, venturing beyond the boundaries of the relevant market.344 This solution neatly 
sidestepped the issue of market definition in two-sided markets which the Court of Justice did 
not discuss. Indeed, it seems that the Court of Justice deliberately refrained from confirming or 
rejecting the General Court’s endorsement of the Commission’s view of the relevant market for 
payment cards since it was not necessary to reach the decision it adopted.345 
 
In MasterCard346 the Court of Justice extended similar reasoning to assessment of restrictions 
of competition ‘by effect’ under Article 101 TFEU. The MasterCard case concerned 
‘multilateral interchange fees’ (MIF) set by MasterCard Inc. and its subsidiaries for payments 
made by using MasterCard and Maestro cards within the European Economic Area (EEA). In 
‘open’ four-party payment systems347, as those of Visa and MasterCard traditionally have been, 
there is often an interchange fee that typically a cardholder’s bank (the ‘issuing bank’) charges 
to a merchant’s bank (the ‘acquiring bank’) upon each transaction between a cardholder and a 
merchant that is made by using a system’s payment card.348 The interchange fees should not be 
confused with fees that the acquiring bank charges to merchants for its services or fees that the 
issuing bank may charge to cardholders from holding and using the card. The MIF is a fallback 
or default interchange fee, set by the payment card association that operates the payment system 
in the absence of a bilateral agreement between the issuing and the acquiring bank on 
interchange fees.349 Figure 1 demonstrates the operation of a four-party payment card scheme. 
 
 
344 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 142. See also Case C‑32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt, 
EU:C:2013:160, para 36, and the case law cited therein. 
345 Franck and Peitz 2019, p. 30. 
346 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201. 
347 In an ‘open’ payment system, such as those of Visa and MasterCard, the members of the payment card 
association issue cards, acquire merchants and set prices independently whereas in a ‘closed’ payment system, 
such as those of American Express, Diners Club and Discover, the payment card company that operates the 
payment system issues cards, acquires merchants and set prices directly. See Klein et al. 2006, p. 572. 
348 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 304. 
349 Case COMP/34.579 MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 Commercial 
Cards, para 1. 
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Figure 1. A four-party payment card scheme.350 
 
Alternatively, it is possible that an ‘open’ payment system is operated by an independent 
payment card company instead of an association of issuing and acquiring banks in which case 
the payment system involves five parties. In the 2000s, both Visa and MasterCard have 
restructured themselves as publicly traded companies in response to regulatory and antitrust 
interventions.351 In this case, the default interchange fee (or MIF) is set by the payment card 
company. However, the distinction between a four-party and a five-party payment system is 
hardly relevant for the purposes of this analysis; henceforth these are treated interchangeably.352 
Figure 2 demonstrates the operation of a five-party payment system. 
 
 
 
350 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, p. 305, Figure 4. Modified by the author. 
351 Ibid, p. 305. 
352 See ibid, note 36. 
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Figure 2. A five-party payment card scheme.353 
 
The classic thesis of economic theory behind the interchange fees is that, under an assumption 
of perfect competition on both the issuing and acquiring side of the payment system, the 
interchange fee is fully passed through to benefit cardholders, which encourages more 
cardholders to use the payment card.354 The payment card association or company operating 
the payment platform maximises its profits by maximising total output of the payment system, 
that is, transactions made by its cards; it is therefore beneficial for it to increase the number of 
cardholders who, on average, are more price sensitive than merchants. The purpose of balancing 
between the issuing and the acquiring side through interchange fees is to influence the relative 
prices between cardholders and merchants to increase transactions.355 It has been argued that in 
a four-party payment system with the “honor-all-cards” rule356 but no default interchange fee, 
issuers would have the incentive to “hold up” acquirers and take advantage of them by 
demanding unreasonably high interchange fees before proceeding on with the transaction.357 
Accordingly, the banks in a four-party payment system should adopt some collective 
mechanism to prevent such exploitative behaviour.358 However, the economics of the payment 
systems is more complex in reality than in models and the actual impact of interchange fees on 
 
353 Ibid, p. 306, Figure 5. Modified by the author. 
354 See Baxter 1983. For more recent models on interchange fees, see e.g. Rochet and Tirole 2002. For an overview 
of the economic literature on interchange fees, see Evans 2011. For recent theoretical research on surcharging and 
merchant prices and policy recommendations, see e.g. Bourguignon et al. 2019. 
355 Klein et al. 2006, pp. 609-610. 
356 The honor-all-cards rule is a standard rule in payment card systems that obligates merchants to accept all cards 
of the payment system irrespective of which bank issued the card. 
357 Klein et al. 2006, p. 574. 
358 Baxter 1983, p. 577. 
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consumer and merchant prices is not usually clear.359 This is probably the reason why 
interchange fees remain a controversial topic in the economic literature and competition 
practice. 
 
Following its investigation into MasterCard’s MIF scheme, the Commission adopted a 
decision360 in which it concluded that the scheme had restricted competition ‘by effect’ under 
Article 101 TFEU by inflating the base for merchant fees; without the MIF the merchant fees 
would have been lower.361 The MIF was also not objectively necessary for the operation of the 
payment card system as was evidenced by other open payment card schemes without a MIF.362 
The Commission remarked that to solve the possibility that issuing banks might hold up 
acquirers, MasterCard could have adopted a rule that was less restrictive on competition than 
the MIF such as a prohibition on ex post pricing on the banks in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement between them.363 Unlike in Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee 
decision364 in which the Commission decided that Visa’s MIF scheme satisfied the criteria of 
Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission concluded that MasterCard’s MIF did not fulfill the 
conditions for exemption under Article 101(3). The Commission deemed that MasterCard had 
failed to show the existence of objective efficiencies, to demonstrate that efficiencies 
outweighed restrictions to merchants and to prove that the MIF were indispensable to maximise 
system output.365 
 
The Commission defined the relevant market in the case by employing the logic that was 
described above in the discussion of the Cartes Bancaires decision. Like in its Visa 
International – Multilateral Interchange Fee decision, the Commission distinguished 
competition between payment card networks (‘inter-system’ competition) and competition 
between individual financial institutions for card-related issuing and acquiring activities, thus 
making a distinction between an upstream “system market” and downstream “issuing” and 
 
359 Evans and Mateus 2011, p. 135. 
360 Case COMP/34.579 MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 Commercial 
Cards. 
361 Ibid, para 2. 
362 Ibid, para 665. 
363 Ibid, para 554. In the said paragraph the Commission explains that the rule of prohibiting ex post pricing “would 
oblige the creditor bank to accept any payment validly entered into the system by a debtor bank while prohibiting 
each bank from charging the other bank in the absence of a bilateral agreement on the level of such charges”. 
364 Case COMP/29.373 Visa International - Multilateral Interchange Fee. 
365 Case COMP/34.579 MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 Commercial 
Cards, paras 5-12. 
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“acquiring” markets.366 The Commission defined the relevant market in the case to be the 
national market for acquiring payment cards in the EEA Member States.367 
 
However, similarly as in its Cartes Bancaires decision and unlike in its earlier Visa 
International - Multilateral Interchange Fee decision, the Commission defined that payment 
systems compete to persuade financial institutions (not cardholders and merchants) to join their 
network.368 By focusing on system adoption by banks rather than adoption and usage of cards 
by the end-users, the Commission failed to discuss, among other things, multi-homing, that is, 
use of multiple cards by cardholders and merchants. This had the effect that the Commission 
could not properly assess competition between ‘open’ payment systems such as Visa and 
MasterCard and ‘closed’ payment systems such as American Express and national debit card 
schemes. Not defining a single market to encompass both cardholders and merchants was also 
curious in a sense that the object of the case, the MIF, is a per transaction fee.369 
 
The General Court dismissed the MasterCard’s action for annulment of the Commission 
decision and upheld the decision in its judgment370. The General Court did not agree with the 
appellants’ arguments that the Commission had wrongly concluded that the setting of the MIF 
constituted a restriction of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU, and it also concluded that 
the appellants had not established that the Commission’s reasoning in relation to the conditions 
of Article 101(3) was unlawful.371 An unusual feature of the case was that in May 2006, during 
the Commission’s investigation, MasterCard had an initial public offering (‘IPO’) on the New 
York Stock Exchange. As a result of the IPO, MasterCard became a publicly traded company 
which modified its corporate structure and governance. The appellants claimed on this basis 
that MasterCard had ceased to be an association of undertakings and complained that the 
Commission had wrongly characterised it as such.372 The General Court rejected this plea, 
concurring with the Commission that, despite the changes brought about by MasterCard’s IPO, 
the MasterCard had continued to be “an institutionalised form of coordination of the conduct 
of the banks”.373 
 
 
366 Ibid, paras 278-279. 
367 Ibid, para 329. 
368 Ibid, para 281. 
369 Filistrucchi et al. 2014, pp. 312-313. 
370 Case T-111/08 MasterCard v Commission, EU:T:2012:260. 
371 Ibid, paras 187 and 236. 
372 Ibid, para 238. 
373 Ibid, para 259. 
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Regarding the Commission’s view of the relevant market, the appellants submitted that the 
Commission had erred in finding that there was a distinct acquiring market. The appellants 
promoted the single-market approach and argued that a single relevant market should be defined 
as the four-party payment card system provided a single service at the joint demand of 
cardholders and merchants.374 The General Court rejected this claim, stating that while indeed 
there was interaction between the issuing and acquiring sides, such as the complementary nature 
of issuing and acquiring services and the presence of indirect network effects, services provided 
to cardholders and merchants could be distinguished from each other, and that cardholders and 
merchants exerted separate competitive pressure on the issuing and acquiring banks.375 The 
General Court thus explicitly endorsed the Commission’s definition of a “system market” and 
separate issuing and acquiring markets in payment card markets. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s ruling in its judgment376, likewise 
dismissing the MasterCard’s appeal. Like the Commission and the General Court, the Court of 
Justice did not consider the MIF as objectively necessary for the operation of the MasterCard's 
payment system, stating that the fact that its operation is simply more difficult to implement or 
less profitable without a restriction cannot be deemed to give that restriction the ‘objective 
necessity’ required in order for it to be classified as ancillary.377 Whether the MIF was to be 
considered ‘indispensable’ to the improvement of production or distribution or to the promotion 
of technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefits, had to be determined under the framework of Article 101(3) TFEU. On this part, the 
Court of Justice concluded that the General Court had not erred in law by upholding the 
Commission’s conclusion that the appellants had not demonstrated that the MIF satisfied the 
conditions of Article 101(3). 
 
Though it affirmed the conclusions of the General Court, the Court of Justice however made 
important remarks on analysis of restrictions of competition ‘by effect’ under Article 101(1) 
and provided novel interpretation on assessment of efficiencies under Article 101(3) in the 
context of two-sided markets.378 Firstly, the Court of Justice extended the contextual analysis 
 
374 Ibid, para 174. 
375 Ibid, paras 176-177. 
376 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201. 
377 Ibid, para 91. An ancillary restriction is a restriction which falls outside Article 101(1) TFEU because it is 
directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main operation that is not anticompetitive in nature, see 
ibid, paras 89-90 and the case law cited therein, and also Case T-112/99 Métropole télévision (M6) v Commission, 
EU:T:2001:215, paras 104-110. 
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to the assessment of effect restrictions in two-sided markets, in the same fashion as it did with 
respect to object restrictions in Cartes Bancaires: 
 
“In order to determine whether coordination between undertakings must be considered to be 
prohibited by reason of the distortion of competition which it creates, it is necessary […] to take 
into account any factor that is relevant, having regard, in particular, to the nature of the services 
concerned, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and the structure of the markets, in 
relation to the economic or legal context in which that coordination occurs, regardless of whether 
or not such a factor concerns the relevant market.”379 
 
Again, the Court of Justice pointed out the need for contextual analysis regardless of the specific 
definition of the relevant market. The Court of Justice did not take a stand on market definition 
itself as that point was not directly challenged in the appeal, but it still recognised that the 
economic and legal context of the coordination between acquiring and issuing banks in the 
MasterCard’s open payment system included the system’s two-sided nature, particularly since 
it was undisputed that there was interaction between its two sides.380 
 
Secondly, the Court of Justice provided novel interpretation on assessment of efficiencies under 
Article 101(3) TFEU in the context of two-sided markets. There are three types of efficiencies 
that are used in industrial organization theory and microeconomics in general.381 First, there is 
allocative efficiency that results from an efficient distribution of economic resources between 
different goods and services. This maximises the total surplus of consumers and producers and 
ensures that the optimal amount of goods and services are produced in the economy. Second, 
there is productive efficiency that results from producing goods and services at the lowest cost 
possible. Thereby, as little as possible of society’s scarce resources is expended in their 
production. Third, there is dynamic efficiency that results from stimulating technological 
research and development. This eventually allows the production of new and better goods and 
services. Technically, productive and dynamic efficiencies are components of allocative 
efficiency but it is common to distinguish between these efficiencies.382 However, the role of 
productive and dynamic efficiencies as elements of allocative efficiency is reflected in the 
wording of the first condition of Article 101(3) TFEU under which a restriction must contribute 
to “improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
 
379 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 177. Emphasis added. 
380 Ibid, paras 178-179. 
381 See Cabral 2000, pp. 26-29. 
382 Ibid, pp. 28-29. 
 
69 
 
progress” to satisfy that condition. The Court of Justice has further added that this improvement 
must show ‘appreciable objective advantages’ of “such a character as to compensate for the 
disadvantages which they cause in the field of competition”.383 
 
In MasterCard, the central efficiency argument of the MasterCard was that the MIF maximised 
system output by balancing cardholder and merchant demands.384 The MasterCard further 
claimed that the MIF maximised the overall benefits of the system to merchants and cardholders 
“by reducing costs, increasing services levels and contributing to overall economic welfare”.385 
Basically, this argument was built on a premise that the MIF contributed to improving allocative 
efficiency by distribution of benefits to cardholders and merchants. The Commission 
recognised the link between economic efficiency and consumer benefits and, accordingly, 
determined that the analysis of whether the alleged increase in system output satisfied the first 
condition of Article 101(3) was to be examined together with the second condition of Article 
101(3) (“allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”), that is, the question of 
whether there was a sufficient pass-on of benefits to cardholders and merchants.386 
 
The factor complicating any assessment of allocative efficiency in two-sided markets is that, 
because of network effects, the two sides of the market are interdependent and there is a 
possibility that restrictions on one side of a platform may harm users on that side but at the 
same time benefit users on the other side of the platform.387 For example, in the presence of 
positive network effects, if more users join the platform because of the benefit they gain from 
restrictions, it might increase the utility of the side that was harmed to some extent, possibly 
even entirely offsetting the harm suffered from restrictions. In the case of payment card systems, 
it might be that an increase in interchange fees or MIFs harms merchants but also encourages 
more cardholders to use the card if the increased fees are passed through to cardholders as 
benefits, thereby possibly increasing the number of transactions of the payment system. 
However, welfare effects of any such restrictions are case-specific, as economics does not 
provide any general basis for the assumption that increases in price will always pass through 
from one side of a platform to the other in the form of lower prices or higher quality.388 
 
383 Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission, EU:C:1966:41. 
384 Case COMP/34.579 MasterCard, Case COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, Case COMP/38.580 Commercial 
Cards, para 688. 
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Therefore, it is not clear how antitrust authorities should weigh gains and losses between 
different sides of a platform resulting from anticompetitive conduct on one side of the platform. 
 
Two different approaches to address this issue have been presented in the literature. The ‘net-
effects analysis’ maintains that all consumer groups on different sides of the platform should 
receive equal weight and that the focus of analysis of anticompetitive restrictions should be on 
their net welfare effects. The ‘separate-effects analysis’ in turn proposes that harm from 
restricted competition to one consumer group cannot be offset by benefits to some other group 
as each consumer group is entitled to benefits of competition.389 Katz and Sallet promote the 
separate-effects analysis, arguing that the link between the net price and consumer welfare is 
not sufficiently strong to justify excluding the price structure from the effects analysis and that 
the separate-effects analysis better accommodates the central proposition of the theory of two-
sided markets that both the price level and the price structure matter for the competitive analysis 
and welfare effects of the platforms.390 Moreover, Katz advises against using changes in output 
such as transactions volume as a proxy for changes in consumer welfare and argues that this 
amounts to another fallacy from applying one-sided logic to two-sided markets: 
 
“Although not on Wright’s (2004) original list, the use of transactions volume as a welfare proxy 
is another example of the fallacy of applying one‐sided logic to two‐sided markets. In a one‐sided 
market, an increase in output holding quality constant typically corresponds to an improvement 
in consumer welfare absent price discrimination. But in a two‐sided market, divergences between 
changes in transactions volumes and changes in consumer welfare can arise because the interests 
of users on opposites sides of a platform generally are not aligned, and a platform may engage in 
conduct that exploits this fact.”391 
 
In addition to allocative efficiency, the question of distribution of benefits between different 
sides of a platform is linked to the question of fairness. Who should benefit from competitive 
markets the most: the society, consumers in general or some groups of consumers over others? 
This question has an interesting (and vast) ethical dimension which is not explored further in 
 
389 Ibid, p. 2162. 
390 Ibid, pp. 2167-2168. 
391 Katz 2019, p. 146. See also Schwartz and Vincent 2006, who have shown in the context of a credit card network 
how volume of card usage in relation to cash and welfare effects of a payment system are affected by rebates and 
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this context.392 Instead, this analysis is limited to welfare economics, where a standard measure 
of allocative efficiency is ‘Pareto optimality’ (or ‘Pareto efficiency’). Pareto efficiency means 
that there is no allocation of resources which would increase the utility of one person without 
making someone else worse off.393 Pareto optimality is a minimum notion of efficiency in a 
sense that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficiency; it allows for severely 
unequal and unfair distributions of resources (for instance, an extreme outcome in which one 
person has all the resources of the economy would be Pareto optimal because any redistribution 
of resources would make this person worse off). Hence, only some Pareto efficient outcomes 
out of the many that usually exist may be socially desirable or “fair” under some other 
criteria.394 
 
Despite these limitations, Pareto efficiency remains a useful concept when showing efficiency 
of an allocative mechanism; efficient mechanisms with other desirable properties usually satisfy 
also Pareto optimality. Moreover, Pareto efficiency has a central role in the two fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics, which demonstrate its necessity for socially optimal 
distributions of resources.395 The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics informally 
states that under certain assumptions (i.a. perfect information and no externalities) any 
competitive market equilibrium is Pareto efficient. The second fundamental theorem of welfare 
economics, which is the reverse of the first theorem, informally states (under more restrictive 
assumptions) that any Pareto optimal equilibrium can be reached through the operation of the 
competitive market mechanism given some initial allocation of resources. These results in their 
mathematical form are powerful because they provide a formal theoretical foundation for the 
argument of Adam Smith and later economists that the market mechanism maximises social 
welfare through optimal allocation of resources.396 In practice, however, the applicability of the 
theorems is limited because their assumptions do not hold in real markets and, moreover, 
because it might not be possible to redistribute all the resources of the society to reach some 
 
392 Although many criteria for allocative efficiency and fairness have been presented in the economics and 
philosophy literature (perhaps most famously by Rawls 1971), the question of which alternatives are socially 
preferable to some other alternatives remains open in welfare economics and social choice theory, see e.g. Feldman 
and Serrano 2006, pp. 217-227. 
393 Technically, this is strong Pareto efficiency. Weak Pareto efficiency requires only that there is no allocation 
which would increase the utility of all persons without making someone worse off. All market outcomes which 
are strongly Pareto efficient are also weakly Pareto efficient but not vice versa. See e.g. Myerson 1991, p. 378. 
394 For example, Feldman and Kirman 1974 have shown that a criterion of fairness as “non-envy” might be contrary 
to Pareto efficiency: even if economic transactions themselves are fair, they cannot be expected to establish or 
preserve allocative fairness. 
395 The original theorems were established by Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959). 
396 See e.g. Feldman and Serrano 2006, pp. 59-70, for a discussion and demonstration of these theorems. 
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desired socially optimal equilibrium.397 For instance, because of externalities such as network 
effects, it is not clear to which extent the market mechanism creates Pareto efficient outcomes 
in two-sided markets.398 
 
Considering the above discussion on necessity of Pareto optimality for efficient distribution 
mechanisms, it is difficult to envisage how any balancing of benefits and harms between the 
two sides of a two-sided platform could improve social welfare if this balancing was not Pareto 
improving399. Therefore, it can be concluded that in order to be welfare-enhancing, any 
distribution of benefits and harms between different sides of a platform must be a Pareto 
improvement. This assessment of welfare effects obviously requires taking the price structure 
into account. Otherwise, there is a possibility that a restriction might result in one group of users 
suffering a net harm and another group gaining a net benefit even without any discernible net 
effect in the total price level.400 It follows that the net-effects analysis, in general, must be 
rejected because it might ignore market outcomes that are actually welfare-reducing. Hence, 
the separate-effects analysis should be adopted as the basic framework for analysis of welfare 
effects in two-sided markets. However, it should be noted that the condition that any efficiencies 
must be Pareto improving does not mean that in practice it must be shown that every individual 
would be better off. The Court of Justice has affirmed in its case law that under Article 101(3) 
TFEU, “it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets that 
must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of 
consumers”.401 
 
In essence, the framework of Article 101(3) TFEU incorporates the concept of Pareto efficiency 
in its second condition which requires that in order to be exempt from the application of Article 
101(1) a restrictive agreement must (in addition to fulfilling the other three conditions of Article 
101(3)) allow consumers “a fair share of the resulting benefit”. The Commission has equated 
this condition to Pareto improvement as is evident from the Commission’s Article 101(3) 
Guidelines in which the Commission has stated that “the pass-on of benefits must at least 
compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them by the restriction 
 
397 Sen 1993, p. 522, have remarked that it is a sociological fact that “enthusiastic advocates of the market 
mechanism are typically not particularly revolutionary in demanding radial redistributions of ownership”. 
398 Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986 have shown that in the presence of externalities market equilibria are generally 
not Pareto efficient and identified a framework for analysing when policy interventions are Pareto improving. 
399 Pareto improvement increases the utility of at least one person without making anyone worse off. Pareto 
improvements can only exist for those outcomes which are not (strongly) Pareto efficient. 
400 Katz and Sallet 2018, p. 2161. 
401 Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax v Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), EU:C:2006:734, 
para 70, and Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 236. 
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of competition” and that “the net effect of the agreement must at least be neutral from the point 
of view of those consumers directly or likely affected by the agreement”.402 
 
The Commission has considered that the assessment of efficiencies must be made within the 
confines of the relevant market. This means that efficiencies generated by a restrictive 
agreement must in general occur in the same relevant market as the anticompetitive effects of 
the agreement and be sufficient to outweigh those effects there. Negative effects on consumers 
in one market cannot normally be balanced against and compensated by positive effects for 
consumers in another unrelated market.403 Pursuant to Article 101(3) Guidelines, there is only 
one exception to this rule. The Commission considers that efficiencies on separate but related 
markets can be taken into account if the group of consumers affected by the restriction and 
benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially the same (so-called ‘consumer 
commonality’).404 In principle, this limited exception or the Commission’s approach do not 
allow compensating anticompetitive effects of restrictions on one side of a two-sided market 
with benefits of those restrictions on another side of that market if those sides are defined as 
separate but interdependent markets. The definition of the relevant market thus limits the scope 
of efficiencies that can be considered under Article 101(3); as a result, defendants may be 
unduly deprived of the chance to benefit from it.405 
 
In accordance with the Article 101(3) Guidelines, the General Court adopted the separate-
effects analysis in MasterCard and concluded that both user groups, cardholders and merchants, 
had to be compensated under the second condition of Article 101(3): 
 
“[A]s merchants constitute one of the two groups of users affected by payment cards, the very 
existence of the second condition of Article [101(3) TFEU] necessarily means that the existence 
of appreciable objective advantages attributable to the MIF must also be established in regard to 
them.”406 
 
 
402 Article 101(3) Guidelines, para 85. 
403 Ibid, para 43. 
404 Ibid. See also Case T-86/95 Compagnie générale maritime and Others v Commission, EU:T:2002:50, para 343, 
where the General Court determined, in the context of consumer commonality, that advantages may arise not only 
for the relevant market but also “for every other market on which the agreement might have beneficial effects, and 
even, in a more general sense, for any service the quality or efficiency of which might be improved by the existence 
of that agreement”. 
405 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 146. 
406 Case T-111/08 MasterCard v Commission, EU:T:2012:260, para 228. 
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The General Court’s reasoning on this point was not discussed by the Court of Justice on 
appeal.407 However, from the manner how the Court of Justice addressed the complaint of the 
appellants that the General Court did not give a reason why merchants and consumers must 
benefit from the same share of the profit resulting from the MIF, it is clear that the Court of 
Justice endorsed the General Court’s separate-effects analysis. The Court of Justice noted that 
the complaint was based on “a misreading of the judgment under appeal” and that the General 
Court “did not in any way find that each group of consumers should benefit from the same share 
of that profit, but merely indicated that, as merchants constitute one of the two groups of users 
affected by payment cards, they should also enjoy appreciable objective advantages attributable 
to the MIF”.408 The Court of Justice concluded that, by using the word ‘also’, the General Court 
had thus correctly indicated that merchants had to enjoy the MIF ‘as well as’ cardholders but 
not ‘to the same extent’ as them.409 
 
Despite accepting the General Court’s rejection of the appellants’ efficiency plea on its facts 
and dismissing the appeal in its entirety, the Court of Justice discussed in depth how efficiencies 
should be assessed in the context of two-sided markets and provided novel interpretation which 
departs from the Commission practice in three fundamental respects.410 
 
First, the Court of Justice determined that in order to assess whether the first condition of Article 
101(3) can be fulfilled in case of a two-sided system, it is necessary to take into account all the 
objective advantages flowing from the restrictive measure “not only on the market in respect of 
which the restriction has been established, but also on the market which includes the other group 
of consumers associated with that system”.411 This effectively means that both sides of a two-
sided market matter to the assessment of efficiencies under Article 101(3). The Court of Justice 
did not accept the appellants’ argument that the General Court had wrongly ignored the two-
sided nature of the MasterCard’s payment system; the Court of Justice deemed instead that the 
General Court had specifically recognised that there was interaction between the two sides of 
the system and taken its two-sided nature appropriately into account in its analysis.412 Likewise, 
the Court of Justice concluded that the General Court had also taken the two-sided nature of the 
system into account when examining the advantages that merchants enjoyed from the MIF.413 
 
407 Whish and Bailey 2018, p. 170, note 142. 
408 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 248. Emphasis added. 
409 Ibid. 
410 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 148. 
411 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 237. 
412 Ibid, para 238. 
413 Ibid, para 239. 
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Second, the Court of Justice established that the proof of a “minimum of efficiencies” on the 
side that is harmed by a restriction is required for the efficiencies on the other side of the 
platform to be relevant for the analysis.414 In the light of the above principle that the two-sided 
nature of the system needs to considered in the assessment of efficiencies, the General Court 
was required to take into account all the objective advantages from the MIF “not only on the 
relevant market, namely the acquiring market, but also on the separate but connected issuing 
market”.415 Should the General Court have found any appreciable objective advantages to 
merchants from the MIF (even if those advantages could not in themselves compensate for the 
effects of the restriction), then all the advantages on both consumer markets (including that of 
the cardholders) could have justified the MIF if those advantages did together compensate for 
its restrictive effects.416 This Court of Justice’s approach can to be understood to relax the strict 
standard of the separate-effects analysis; even though both sides of the market must enjoy 
objective advantages, those advantages do not need to compensate fully for the disadvantages 
on the side of the market which is harmed by the restriction. 
 
Third, the Court of Justice determined that if the “minimum of efficiencies” requirement is met, 
then efficiencies on both sides of a two-sided market can be taken into account in the assessment 
of efficiencies regardless of any consumer commonality.417 The Court of Justice acknowledged 
that, in the absence of appreciable objective advantages in the relevant market, the advantages 
on a separate but connected market associated with a two-sided system cannot in themselves 
compensate for the disadvantages resulting from the restriction, in particular where the 
consumers on those markets are not substantially the same.418 Thereby, the Court of Justice 
effectively established another exception (to complement that of consumer commonality in one-
sided markets and applying only to two-sided markets) to the rule that negative effects on 
consumers in one market cannot be compensated by positive effects in another unrelated 
market. 
 
Regarding the MasterCard’s MIF scheme, however, the Court of Justice concluded that as the 
General Court had determined that there was no proof of the existence of objective advantages 
to merchants from the MIF, it was not necessary to examine in those circumstances the MIF’s 
 
414 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 148. 
415 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 240. 
416 Ibid, para 241. 
417 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 148. 
418 Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, EU:C:2014:2201, para 242. 
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advantages to cardholders, since they could not in themselves compensate for the disadvantages 
resulting from the MIF.419 It was thus the appellants’ failure to show any objective advantages 
to merchants resulting from the MIF that denied the Court of Justice a chance to apply its new 
exception rule to the case. Nonetheless, MasterCard clarified the framework of assessment of 
efficiencies under Article 101(3) and enabled, in the context of the two-sided platforms, the 
recognition of a broader range of efficiencies in separate but interdependent markets when 
compared with the case law that preceded the judgment.420 Combined with the contextual 
analysis of object and effect restrictions that was extended to two-sided platforms by Cartes 
Bancaires and MasterCard, respectively, this serves to lessen emphasis on market definition 
and reduce the problems associated with it in two-sided markets. Such approach is therefore to 
be welcomed. 
 
As for the MIFs, they continue to be objects of regulatory and antitrust interventions in the EU. 
In April 2015, the EU adopted regulation421 to cap the interchange fees from December 2015 
for both domestic and cross-border consumer credit and debit card transactions within the EU. 
In January 2019, the Commission fined MasterCard 570 million euros for its (pre-December 
2015) cross-border acquiring rules which infringed Article 101(1) by preventing merchants in 
EU countries with high domestic MIFs from benefiting from lower service fees offered by 
banks in EU countries with lower domestic MIFs.422 In April 2019, the Commission accepted 
commitments from Visa and MasterCard to lower their inter-regional MIFs which are 
interchange fees that are applied to payments made within the EEA area with credit and debit 
cards issued outside the EEA.423 In April 2020, the Court of Justice gave a preliminary ruling 
on a case Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others424 which was referred 
to it by the Supreme Court of Hungary and which concerned the interpretation of Article 101(1) 
TFEU in the context of an interbank agreement on interchange fees. The case concerned the 
Hungarian competition authority’s investigation into an agreement of Hungarian financial 
institutions belonging to Visa’s and MasterCard’s payment card systems that fixed the level of 
interchange fees and whether that agreement could, in principle, be classified as a restriction of 
competition ‘by object’. In its analysis, the Court of Justice reiterated many of the principles of 
Cartes Bancaires and emphasised the need for the contextual analysis of restrictive agreements 
 
419 Ibid, para 243. 
420 Pradelles and Scordamaglia-Tousis 2014, p. 152. 
421 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees 
for card-based payment transactions, published in OJ 2015/L 123/01. 
422 Case AT.40049 MasterCard II, decision of 22 January 2019. 
423 Case AT.39398 Visa MIF and Case AT.40049 MasterCard II, decision of 24 April 2019. 
424 Case C-228/18 Gazdasági Versenyhivatal v Budapest Bank Nyrt. and Others, EU:C:2020:265. 
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concerning two-sided systems. The Court of Justice did not rule out the possibility of classifying 
the interbank agreement in question as an agreement which restricted competition 'by object' 
but stated, however, that the agreement could not be classified as such unless that agreement 
could be regarded as posing a sufficient degree of harm to competition, which was a matter for 
the referring court to determine.425 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this thesis, I have presented the economic theory underlying competition law in general and 
two-sided markets in particular and, in the light of that theory, discussed the role of market 
definition in antitrust analysis and the Court of Justice case law on two-sided markets in cases 
concerning payment card systems. The Court of Justice’s seminal rulings in cases Cartes 
Bancaires and MasterCard show that it has paid attention to insights of economic research. 
Those judgments leave no doubt that the two-sided nature of platforms matter for their 
competitive analysis under the EU competition rules. Unlike the General Court, which endorsed 
the Commission’s market definition practice of payment card systems, the Court of Justice did 
not address the issue of market definition explicitly as it was not specifically asked to do so on 
appeal in those cases. Despite avoiding a discussion on market definition, the Court of Justice 
however emphasised the need for contextual analysis of restrictive agreements under Article 
101 TFEU concerning two-sided platforms regardless of the definition of the relevant market. 
This is a rather flexible approach that in general places less emphasis on market definition in 
two-sided markets, thus avoiding some of the potential problems associated with that process. 
The case law of the CJEU, however, offers only limited guidance for practitioners of 
competition law; many questions remain open awaiting new case law which is sure to follow 
as the importance of digital platforms increases in the economy. 
 
There is no reason to doubt that the EU competition rules as they are provided in the Treaties 
would not be fit to address the specific issues of two-sided markets arising in competition 
analysis of multi-sided platforms. The rules themselves are very general in nature and quite 
adaptive in their interpretation as the CJEU case law and the Commission’s decision-making 
practice over the years have shown. However, the Commission should clarify its practice on 
certain dimensions of competitive analysis of multi-sided platforms preferably by way of 
guidelines or notices now that it has extensive experience on dealing with two-sided markets. 
 
425 Ibid, para 86. 
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These specific questions in the area of market definition include whether a ‘single’ two-sided 
market or two separate but ‘interrelated’ markets should be defined, how to adjust the SSNIP 
test to take network effects into account and how to define the relevant market in the presence 
of a zero price on one side of the platform, which is a common practice in multi-sided platforms. 
Some recommendations have been presented in this thesis in addition to which a vast amount 
of academic literature and international debate between competition authorities exists on the 
issue. 
 
On 9 December 2019, Vice-President of the European Commission and European 
Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager delivered a speech in a competition 
conference in Brussels in which she announced that the Commission is planning to review its 
Notice on Market Definition.426 Since the publication of that notice over twenty years ago, the 
single market has developed greatly as many markets which previously were national have 
become European-wide. At the same time, econometric techniques have been developed and 
refined to make better use of economic evidence in the market definition practice. Globalisation 
and digitisation are trends which increasingly continue to transform markets while creating new 
challenges for defining geographic and product markets. Suggesting the Commission should 
make it clearer that market definition is not an end in itself, Vestager described the proper role 
market definition should play in the competition analysis of markets – digital or otherwise: 
 
“Defining markets isn’t like agreeing the border between two countries, by drawing a line on a 
map. It’s more like charting a coastline. The shape is already there – our job is just to measure it 
as accurately as we can. And nothing we do will change the shape of that coastline itself.”427 
 
The review of the Notice on Market Definition offers a great opportunity to address the specific 
issues of market definition in two-sided markets as the Commission repositions itself in 
response to challenges of the digital age. Some of these challenges were addressed in a report 
on competition policy in the digital era that was published in Spring 2019 and written by three 
special advisers on an assignment by Commissioner Vestager. One of the key takeaways of the 
report was that the Commission needs to adapt and refine its methodology in defining the 
relevant markets and measuring market power of digital platforms.428 
 
 
426 European Commission 2020. 
427 Ibid. 
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Evans has observed that, by now, the highest courts in the three largest jurisdictions (the United 
States, EU and China) have concluded that two-sided features are relevant for assessing whether 
restraints are anticompetitive. For this reason, the debated question should no longer be whether 
both sides of the market should matter for competitive assessment but rather how they should 
be considered in that assessment and what tools should be used in the analysis.429 It is clear 
from the discussion of this thesis that multi-sided platforms will continue to offer fresh ground 
for further legal and economic research and to influence the case law and competition practice 
for many years to come. 
 
429 Evans 2019, p. 338. 
